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I. INTRODUCTION
When coal, oil and gas production occur near each other, there are
regulatory' requirements for each that can apply to the other.2 This Article addresses
selected oil and gas regulatory requirements that, when not properly enforced, can
affect coal, oil and gas producers. These selected oil and gas regulatory
requirements include both coalbed methane and conventional oil and gas
requirements.3
The coalbed methane that can be vented from coal mine areas and
For definitional purposes, the terms "regulatory" and "regulation" are used in this Article to refer
to state statutes and regulations, and the orders and enforcement that arise out of them encompassing, for example, all aspects of requirements, enforcement, inspection, identification of
violations, notices, hearings, and appeals - except where reference to a specific statute, regulation,
rule, order, or policy is specifically limited by its specific identification.
2

Compare,e.g. ,W.

VA. CODE

§§ 22-6-1 to -41 (1994) with W. VA. CODE §§ 22-21-1 to -29 (1994)

and W. VA. CODE § 22A-2-75 (1994).

' See generally W. VA. CODE §§ 22-6-1 to -41, 22-10-1 to -12, 22-21-1 to -29 (1994).
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degasified from coal seams is subject to oil and gas regulation Many oil and gas
wells in the state drill (and have been drilled) through coal seams.' The regulatory
focus on these oil and gas wells has included, inter alia, fostering the safety of
miners,6 and preventing the waste of coal, 7 oil and gas.' One aspect of these wells
is that, currently, there are estimated over nineteen thousand abandoned wells in
West Virginia,9 and - where they have been drilled near or through coal seams the safety and waste concerns are susceptible to being compounded, both by lack of
contemporaneous stewardship of the wells and by obfuscation of the identities with
which to deal or fix responsibility.
Accordingly, this Article reviews selected oil and gas regulatory issues, with
an eye towards discerning compliance within the oil and gas regulatory program.
It is with that eye that Section II of this Article highlights example interfaces
between coal regulation and oil and gas regulation. These interfaces are a starting
point from which to examine operational and responsibility considerations, such as,
inter alia,safety and liability.'0

' See, e.g.,W. VA. CODE § 22-21-1 (1994) (declaring public policy and legislative findings), W. VA.
CODE § 22-21-4 (1994) (defining the powers and duties of the Chief of the Office of Oil and Gas to
include "supervising the execution and enforcement of the provisions of this article"); See also 42
U.S.C. § 13,368 (1994). The Energy Policy Act of 1992 fosters the fullest practical recovery of
coalbed methane, and chapter 22, article 21 of the West Virginia Code regulates coalbed methane wells
and units in West Virginia. Cf., e.g., Lewin et al., Unlocking the Fire: 4 Proposalfor Judicialor
LegislativeDeterminationof the Ownership of CoalbedMethane, 94 W. VA. L. REv. 563, 568 (1992)
("[Virtually all of the CBM [coalbed methane was] vented into the atmosphere.").
5 See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 22-6-18 (1994) (discussing protective devices when well penetrates
workable coal bed and when gas is found beneath or between workable coal beds); see also H. L.
Snyder & C. Lynch Christian, III, Oil and Gas OperationsThrough CoalSeams in West Virginia, I
E. MIN. L. INST. § 5.02[1] (1980) ("West'Virginia coal seams are generally closer to the surface than
oil and gas horizons.").
6

See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 22-6-15 (1994); cf, e.g., Snyder & Christian, supra note 5, at §

5.02[1][b][i].
7 See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 22-21-1.
8 See, e.g., W. VA. CODE §§ 22-6-31 to -33 (1994).
9 See generally OFFICE OF OIL & GAS, WEST VIRGINIA Div. OF ENvT'L. PROTECTION, THE HUNT FOR

ABANDONED WELLS (1996) (stating that approximately 20% of those wells are estimated to present
an imminent danger to the environment) [hereinafter cited as HuNT FOR ABANDONED WELLS].
"o This Article is limited to regulatory enforcement. Compare,e.g., Shostak, The Prosecution and
Defense of a Water Well ContaminationCase, 14 E. MIN. L. INST., ch. 21 (1993) (addressing private
litigation over selected safety and liability claims) with Donnell, Environmental LiabilitiesArising
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Section III highlights the procedural apparatus by which state regulatory oil
and gas requirements are enforced. Procedural requirements are addressed with
regard to identifying violations, notices, opportunities to abate, opportunities for
hearing, orders, and appeals."
In Section IV, two separate but intertwined topics are addressed:
operatorship and bona fide future use. The first topic, operatorship, forms a basis
for identifying entities for regulatory responsibility and forms a basis, therefore, for
enforcement. Within operatorship, three requirements - again, separate but
intertwined - are addressed: (1) registration, which concerns identifying parties
responsible for compliance with the regulatory program; 2 (2) financial
responsibility, which concerns guaranteeing performance of the regulatory
requirements; 3 and (3) transfer, which concerns regulatory compliance
considerations necessary to obtain release of bonding responsibility. 4 The second
topic, bona fide future use,"' analyzes this operator application for delay,
and finds
6
that it is largely overmatched by the requirement to "produce or plug.'
This Article, then, analyzes selected regulatory requirements that can affect
selected coal, oil, and gas circumstances. Each selected circumstance in this article
can be affected in a variety of ways by each selected regulatory requirement.
Accordingly, each selected circumstance is analyzed separately.

from Ownership of Oil and Gas Properties,9 E. MIN. L. REv. (1988); and Jolynne Corp. v. Michels,
446 S.E.2d 494 (W. Va. 1994) (dealing with the civil remedy of chapter 36, article 4, section 9(a) of
the West Virginia Code between private parties, wherein absence of commercial production for two
years is presumed abandonment of the well).
See generally W. VA. CODE§§ 22-6-1 to -41, 22-10-1 to -12 (1994).
12

Registration, in the sense that an operator may submit information to the Office of Oil and Gas

about its operations, can arise at any time an operator contacts the Office of Oil and Gas, as when, inter
alia, the operator requests a permit to drill, requests approval of its bond, or requests transfer of a
property. However, the term is generally identified with an operator filing a Form OP-I. See W.VA.
CODE STATE R. § 38-18-10.3 (1996) (effective date 1993). See discussion infra part IV.A.I.
'3

See generally W. VA. CODE §§ 22-6-26, 22-10-4, 22-10-5, 22-21-8 (1994).

"4 Transfer is a term generally under the umbrella of regulatory law. W. VA. CODE STATE R. § 18-10-3
to -5 (1996) (effective date 1993). The provision of most impact, however, is in the West Virginia
Code. W. VA. CODE § 22-6-26(g) (1994) (regarding release of a transferor's bond); see discussion
infra part IV.A.3.

15 See,

W. VA. CODE § 22-6-19 (1994).

16 Id.
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II. SELECTED REGULATORY INTERFACES BETWEEN COAL, OIL AND GAS

A.

CoalBed Methane Regulatory Considerations

Coalbed methane venting from mine areas and degasification from coal
seams "has been and continues to be approved by the State for the purpose of
ensuring the safe recovery of coal."' 7 Two statutory enactments recognized an
expansion of this purpose: the federal Energy Policy Act of 199218 and chapter 22,
article 21 of the West Virginia Code. These enactments recognized both a national
and a state need to encourage commercial recovery and marketing of coalbed
methane.' 9 Chapter 22, article 21 of the West Virginia Code2 ° sets forth a
framework within which coalbed methane development is regulated in this state.2'
West Virginia has embraced a forced "pooling" regulatory approach towards

"7W. VA. CODE § 22-21-1(a) (1994) (declaring public policy); see also Snyder & Christian, supra note
5, § 5.03.
"' 42 U.S.C. § 13,368.
19W. VA. CODE § 22-21-1. West Virginia encouragement to develop coalbed methane, however, is
subject to the declaration and finding "that the value of coal is far greater than the value of coalbed
methane and any development of coalbed methane should be undertaken in such a way as to protect
and preserve coal for future safe mining and maximum recovery of the coal." See also Lewin et al.,
supra note 4, at 584-99 (discussing greenhouse effect and extraction-related conflicts associated with
coalbed methane); Jeff L. Lewin, CoalbedMethane: Recent CourtDecisions Leave Ownership "Up
in the Air," but New FederalandState LegislationShould FacilitateProduction,96 W. VA. L. REV.
632, 635-36 (1994) (discussing technology of coalbed methane extraction). Cf Lewin et al., supra
note 5, at 613 (discussing history of coalbed methane legislative proposal drafting by T. Streit, Chief
of the West Virginia Office of Oil and Gas, Division of Environmental Protection).
20

W. VA. CODE §§ 22-21-1 to -29 (1994).

21

See Lewin, supra note 19, at 674. Lewin states:
There are several reasons why the Affected States are likely to adopt their own
programs in lieu of coverage under Section 1339. First, as a matter of pride, each
state is likely to prefer to administer its own program. Second, state forced
pooling programs can be integrated with existing regulatory systems applicable
to the coal and gas industries, whereas federal regulations may conflict with
particular state rules or policies. Third, regulated industries in the Affected States
are likely to prefer the expansion of state regulatory authority to the creation of
a new layer of regulatory bureaucracy administered from Washington, where they
are likely to have less input and less political influence. All three of these reasons
were factors in West Virginia's recent adoption of H.B. 4371.
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ownership of coalbed methane gas.22 Otherwise, the regulatory approach for
extraction and development of coalbed methane generally corresponds with the
West Virginia regulatory approach for other oil and gas extraction and
development.' For example, the safeguards and pre-emptions of coal mining (such
as, the requirements for notice,24 plugging' and mining through)26 present in
conventional oil and gas regulation are also present in coalbed methane gas
regulation.2 7

What is coalbed methane gas? Chapter 22, article 21 of the West Virginia

2 Pooling is set forth by the National Energy Policy Act of 1992. 42 U.S.C. § 13,368; accord W. VA.
CODE §§ 22-21-15 to -19. The West Virginia Code provides:
[i]n the absence of a voluntary agreement, an operator, owner or other party
claiming an ownership interest in the coalbed methane may file an application
with the chief to pool (i) separately owned interests in a single tract, (ii) separately
owned tracts, (iii) separately owned interests in any tract, and (iv) any
combination of (i), (ii) and (iii) to form a drilling unit for the production of
coalbed methane from one or more coalbed methane wells.
W. VA. CODE § 22-21-15(a) (1994); see also Lewin, supranote 19, at 671 (discussing Virginia coalbed
methane regulatory statute requiring forced pooling that dramatically increased coalbed methane
production).
Compare W. VA. CODE §§ 22-6-1 to -41 (1994) with W. VA. CODE §§ 22-21-1 to -29 (1994). See,
e.g., W. VA. CODE §§ 22-6-19, -21-21 (1994) (setting forth requirement to plug wells).
23

Compare W. VA. CODE § 22-6-9 (1994) and W. VA. CODE § 22-6-13 (1994) with W. VA. CODE §
22-21-22 (1994). These requirements for notice can affect both oil and gas operators and coal
operators economically: coal operators may have to mine around a well, leaving large amounts of coal
and using additional dangerous equipment; and an oil and gas operator may have to alter optimal
spacing or be prohibited from drilling due to coal operations. See generally Snyder & Christian, supra
note 5, at §§ 5.02 [l][b][ii],[iv].
24

25

Compare W. VA. CODE § 22-6-24 (1994) with W. VA. CODE § 22-21-23 (1994) (workable seam

mine through).
CompareW. VA. CODE § 22-6-24 with W. VA. CODE § 22-21-22. Lewin explains that:
Although provisions for delay and for compensation make sense in theory, in
practice the representatives of the coal and gas industries are highly unlikely to
agree to their inclusion in forced pooling legislation. The West Virginia
legislation does not allow degasification to delay mining operations, for a coal
operator can compel the CBM developer to plug the well within sixty days by
giving notice of an intention to mine the coal within six months. In order to avoid
the risk of premature plugging of their wells, potential CBM developers can be
expected to negotiate with coal operators to coordinate CBM production with
subsequent coal mining operations.
Lewin, supra note 19, at 681.
26

27 Compare, e.g., W. VA. CODE §§ 22-21-1 to-29 (1994) with 22-6-1 to-41 (1994).
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Code defines coalbed methane gas as "gas which can be produced from a coal seam,
the rock or other strata in communication with a coal seam, a mined-out area or a
gob well."28 For the purposes of this definition, a coal seam, or coal bed is "a seam
of coal, whether workable or unworkable,"29 and "the noncoal roof and floor of said
seam of coal."3' A coalbed methane well is "any hole or well sunk, drilled, bored
or dug into the earth for the production of coalbed methane for consumption or sale,
including a gob well," but excludes those drilled "for core drilling, production of
coal or water, venting of gas from a mine area, or degasification of a coal seam."'
The provisions of chapter 22, article 21 of the West Virginia Code apply to
all lands under which a coalbed is located, and to any coalbed methane well.32 In
contrast, chapter 22, article 21 of the West Virginia Code does not apply (1) to wells
that are otherwise permitted, approved, or regulated under selected articles under
chapter 22 of the West Virginia Code;33 (2) to venting apparatus used for the
purpose of venting any mine or mining area, or (3) to ventilation or degasification
of any coal seam for the mining of coal.34 Moreover, the article does not apply to
subsurface boreholes drilled from the face of the mine, except to the extent that

28 W. VA. CODE

§ 22-21-2(c) (1994). A gob well is a "well drilled or vent hole converted to a well

pursuant to [article 21] which produces or is capable of producing coalbed methane or other natural

gas from a destressed zone created above and below a mined-out coal seam by any prior full seam
extraction of the coal." W. VA CODE § 22-21-2(0)(1994); cf, e.g., Lewin et al., supra note 4, at 57683 (discussing the technology of coalbed methane extraction).
9 W. VA. CODE § 22-21-2(b) (1994). A workable coalbed or workable coal seam is "any seam of coal
twenty inches or more in thickness, or any seam of less thickness which is being commercially mined
or can be shown to be capable of being commercially mined." W. VA. CODE § 22-21-2(r) (1994).
30

W. VA. CODE § 22-21-2(b) (1994).

31 W. VA. CODE § 22-21-2(e)

(1994).

32 W. VA. CODE § 22-21-3(a)

(1994).

3 W. VA. CODE § 22-21-3(b)(1994); see W. VA. CODE §§ 22-6-1 to -41 (1994) (setting forth oil and
gas regulation); W. VA. CODE § 22-7-1 to -8 (1994) (regulating oil and gas production damage
compensation); W. VA. CODE § 22-8-1 to -13 (1994) (regulating transportation of oils); W. VA. CODE
§ 22-9-1 to -13 (1994) (regulating underground gas storage reservoirs); W. VA. CODE § 22-10-1 to -12
(1994) (setting forth Abandoned Well Act); W. VA. CODE § 22C-8-1 to -19 (1994) (promulgating
Shallow Gas Well Review Board); W. VA. CODE § 22C-9-1 to -16 (1994) (promulgating Oil and Gas

Conservation Commission).
14 W. VA. CODE §

22-21-3(b).
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pooling units may be regulated by the article.35 To the extent that coalbed methane
wells are similar to oil and gas wells, and the production of coalbed methane is
similar to the production of natural gas, coalbed methane gas wells and their
production are subject to the pertinent regulatory provisions governing oil and gas
wells under chapter 22, articles six and ten of the West Virginia Code.36 The Chief
of the Office of Oil and Gas is responsible for issuing permits and otherwise
supervising coalbed methane production and compliance with chapter 22, article 21
of the West Virginia Code.37
B.

Intersection with Oil and Gas Regulatory Considerations

As discussed above, the rules governing extraction of coalbed methane
closely reflect the rules governing extraction of oil and gas generally.38 Examples
include the operational requirements concerning, inter alia, surface soil and
erosion, 39 performance bonding, 40 notice to surface owners, 4' protective devices
when drilling through coal beds, 42 abandoned wells,43 plugging wells, 44 injunctive
relief,45 and penalties. 46 Thus, when wells are drilled through coal, both the methane

CODE § 22-21-15 (1994) (covering drilling units and pooling of interests); W. VA. CODE
§ 22-21-16 (1994) (discussing notice to owners); W. VA. CODE § 22-21-17 (1994) (setting forth
application review); W. VA. CODE § 22-21-18 (1994) (covering operation on drilling units); W. VA.
CODE § 22-21-19 (1994) (discussing validity of unit agreements).
35 See W. VA.

36 See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 22-21-3 (1994).

37 See generallyW. VA. CODE § 22-21-4.
38 See generally supranote 2.

3 CompareW. VA. CODE § 22-6-30 (1994) with W. VA. CODE § 22-21-22.
40

CompareW. VA CODE § 22-6-26 (1994) with W. VA. CODE § 22-21-8 (1994).

4' CompareW. VA. CODE § 22-6-9 with W. VA. CODE § 22-21-9 (1994).
42

Compare W. VA. CODE § 22-6-18 with W. VA. CODE § 22-21-14 (1994).

41 Compare W. VA. CODE § 22-6-19 with W. VA. CODE § 22-21-21 (1994).

44 Compare W. VA. CODE § 22-6-24 with W. VA. CODE § 22-21-23.
41 Compare, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 22-6-39 (1994) with W. VA. CODE § 22-21-27 (1994).
46

Compare, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 22-6-34 (1994) with W. VA. CODE § 22-21-28 (1994).
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gas regulatory program and the oil and gas regulatory program require protective
measures to ensure that gas, oil, or water does not seep into the mines or waterbearing strata.47

The foregoing operational considerations raise other concomitant concerns,
including private liability and expense for dangers that arise during operations,48 and
public penalties for violations of state law that arise during operations.49 Economic
losses can arise due to mine shutdowns, repairs, and adjustments to schedules and
operations of the affected mines. The regulatory programs do not regulate economic
losses, but by regulating dangers and safety considerations, enforcement of the
regulatory programs can help minimize those losses. Dangers and safety
considerations that can arise from gas seepage can include potential explosions and
poisons." Dangers and safety considerations that can arise from seepage of water
can include potential well leakage near the mines,5 ' as well as potential pollution,
inter alia, of aquifers, water sources, and surface and ground water. 2 The oil and
gas regulatory programs therefore require safety devices during the life of the wells
41 CompareW. VA. CODE

§ 22-6-18 with W. VA. CODE § 22-21-14.

48 See generally Snyder & Christian, supranote 5, § 5.02[1][b][A]; Mitchell, A Duty To Plug- The

Deep Pocket Theory, I1 E. MIN. L. INST. § 20.01 (1990); Donnell, supra note 10.
41

See, e.g., W. VA. CODE §§ 22-6-34 (authorizing daily penalty in excess of $2500); W. VA. CODE

§ 22-10-9 (1994) (setting $25,000.00 penalty per well for failure to plug within 30 days of Chief s
order); W. VA. CODE § 22-21-28 (1994) (stating that penalty not to exceed reasonable expected net
profit).
o Cf, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 22-6-27 (1994) (providing cause of action for explosions). Compare
Lewin et al., supra note 4, at 566 (declaring that CBM has killed thousands in the mines) with Snyder
& Christian, supra note 5, § 5.02[l][b] ("[N]o coal mine explosion has ever been known to have been
caused by oil or gas leakage from a well, the possibility of encountering gas from an unknown or
undiscovered well must always be considered") and Interview with Theodore M. Streit, Chief, Office
of Oil and Gas, W. Va. Division of Environmental Protection (November 6, 1996) [hereinafter Streit
Interview] (stating that during the past 10 years mines have been flooded as the result of well work and
an explosion occurred on the surface as crews worked on a well to plug it) and OFFICE OF OIL AND
GAS, WEST VIRGINIA Div. OF ENVT'L. PROTECTION, 1995 STATISTICAL REPORT 165 (1995) (discussing
two people burned at well sites and one person inhaled toxic gas ). Therefore, regulatory enforcement
with regard to coalbed methane gas production should take an increased priority due to the
simultaneous vorking of both the coalbed methane and the coal. Cf Lewin et al., supranote 4, at 570
("[V]enting of CBM has been identified as a substantial contributor to the problem of global warming,
often referred to as the 'greenhouse effect."').
", See, e.g., Snyder & Christian, supra note 5, § 5.02[1][b].
52 See, e.g., INTERSTATE OIL & GAS COMPACT COMMN, UNTIED STATES DEPT OF ENERGY, A STUDY
OF IDLE OIL AND GAS WELLS IN THE UNITED STATES 92 (1996) [hereinafter IDLE OIL AND GAS WELLS];

see also W. VA. CODE § 22-6-21 (1994) (addressing installation of fresh water casings).
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and plugging at the end of the life of the wells to pursue preventing these
problems. 3 With regard to coalbed methane extraction, the risk of dangers and
safety considerations should be expected to increase because the coalbed methane
production and the coal mining may be expected to frequently take place
simultaneously, as opposed to conventional oil and gas production. In both
circumstances, specific safety devices are required when wells are drilled through
workable coal seams,54 and abandoned wells are required to be plugged before
mining through them. 5
A problem arising out of early wells is that many were drilled long before
plugging regulation began in 1891.56 As a result, many early wells are not located,
many are not plugged, many are plugged inappropriately under current standards,
and many have rusting and decaying well apparatus. 7 In West Virginia, over
nineteen thousand wells are estimated to be abandoned and are required to be
lawfully plugged. Coal mining through an area containing such wells is subject

" Generally, where the oil and gas currently being developed are located below the coal seams
currently being developed, plugging requirements are set forth in the West Virginia Code. W. VA.
CODE §§ 22-6-23, -24 (1994); see also W. VA. CODE § 22-21-22 (addressing plugging for mine
through).
54 See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 22-6-18.

" See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 22-21-21 (plugging for mine through).
56 Compare INTERSTATE OIL & GAS COMPACT COMMN, WEST VIRGINIA STATE REVIEW, IOGCC
STATE REVIEW OF OIL AND GAS EXPLORATION AND PRODUCTION MANAGEMENT REGULATORY

PROGRAMS 4 (1993) [hereinafter WEST VIRGINIA STATE REVIEW] with R. Neal Pierce & Sharon 0.
Flanery, Orphans,Foundlingsand Wards of the State: Plugging Liabilityfor Orphan and Abandoned
Wells in the Eastern States, 14 E. MIN. L. INST. § 19.01 (1993) tbls. 2-3.
" Cf Snyder & Christian, supra note 5, § 5.04 (describing the early West Virginia requirement to
place a wooden plug at the top and bottom of the well); Cf Snyder & Christian, supra note 5, §

5.02[1][a][iv], [b][i] (stating that oil and gas community believes mine work generates a current that
may be involved in well corrosion and that hazards arise when wells are not mapped, and changes in

the course of the mining increases the hazards associated with increased machinery); see generally W.
VA. CODE § 22-6-24(e) (1994) (setting forth replugging requirements).
51 HUNT FOR ABANDONED WELLS, supra note 9. See generally Pierce & Flanery, supra note 56, at

§ 19.02 (describing sample terms used when addressing abandoned wells). Pierce and Flanery define
the following terms:
[a]-Orphan.
"Orphan" wells refer to that class of idle and unplugged wells or

improperly plugged wells for which no existing solvent responsible entity is
known or can be found .... [t]his class is a large one in states like Pennsylvania,
where significant drilling activity occurred before the adoption of either plugging
or permitting statutes.
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to increased hazards associated with the unascertained locations, and, accordingly,
unknown dangers attendant to such wells - many not located and not recorded are susceptible to surprise.
I1. BASIC OIL AND GAS REGULATORY ENFORCEMENT APPARATUS
A.

Introduction
The

oil

and

gas

regulatory

enforcement

apparatus

is

relatively

[b]-Foundling.
As the common meaning of the term "foundling" suggests, this class of
wells includes those idle and unplugged wells originally drilled by one entity for
which a second, currently existing and solvent entity is wittingly or unwittingly
responsible. As subsequent discussion will suggest, the arrival of a foundling well
at the doorstep may come as a surprise to some entities deemed responsible for
their plugging.
[c]-Latchkeys, Love Children, and Home Aloners.
This third class of wells is at the heart of the Interstate Oil and Gas
Compact Commission's use of the term "idle" wells. It consists of those
unplugged wells not currently producing and unproduced through the defined
statutory abandonment period, either because of (1) operational emphasis on other
or more economic operations ("latchkeys"); (2) the deliberate refusal of the
responsible operator to acknowledge and assume the plugging liability ("love
children"); or (3) the propensity of the responsible party, having acquired the
fruits of the operation, simply to retreat to the condo in Boca Raton leaving the
uneconomic well unplugged and unattended ("home aloners"). It is this class of
wells that is most accurately referred to as "abandoned" when using terms
analogous to minor children.
[d]-Wards of the State.
Depending on the regulatory scheme, this class may be large or small.
It consists of any well from any of the above classes for which the state statute
does or may place primary plugging responsibility on an agency of state
government
Id.; cf WEST VIRGIIA STATE REVIEW, supra note 56, at 16. According to the Interstate Oil and Gas
Compact Commission:
An abandoned well is a well for which no use has been reported for a period of 12
months. [W.VA. CODE § 22-6-19 (1994)]. This type of well is to be distinguished
from the smaller category of "orphan" wells; orphaned wells are wells for which
no owner can be identified. As a practical matter, orphaned wells are also
abandoned wells. OOG has recently undertaken to map the location of orphaned
wells. About 26, 000 orphaned wells had been identified at the time of the review,
and another 15,000 - 25,000 are thought to be orphaned and not yet mapped. In
addition, there are approximately 14,000 wells which have responsible parties but
are abandoned. Some of the operators have started plugging programs and some
others have demonstrated future uses for the wells.
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straightforward, simple and speedy. 9 There is primarily one industry to regulate,
and the substances involved are primarily those attendant to oil and gas operations.6"
Compare the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 6" which regulates
waste in a wide variety of industries, and regulates a wide variety of substances,
including oil and gas.6 (However, oil and gas exploration and production wastes
have been excluded from regulation as hazardous waste, under RCRA, subtitle C.)63
While oil and gas regulation is primarily a state regulatory program, and while there
is no "cradle to grave" oil and gas entree in the federal environmental regulatory
alphabet soup (such as RCRA), the oil and gas regulatory requirements arise out of
both the state oil and gas program and other state and federal environmental
59See, e.g., W. VA. CODE §§ 22-6-1
42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1977).
60

to -4 (1994). Compare Resource Conservation and Recovery Act,

Id.; see generally David M. Flannery, The EnvironmentalRegulatoryDilemma of the Oil and Gas

Industry, 9 E. MIN. L. INST. § 15.01 (1988). According to Flannery:
Historically, the highest priorities of federal environmental regulatory
programs have been focused on the control of large, fixed industrial sources.
These priorities have been defined in this manner in part, because such sources
produce larger volumes of waste material and the sources are relatively few in
number and are easy to identify and to regulate.
By contrast, the oil and gas industry is highly mobile and geographically
diverse. Its sources generate much smaller quantities of waste over much shorter
periods of time. However, the oil and gas industry has a very large number of
sources with thousands of new sources being added each year. The small size of
oil and gas sources and their large numbers have, until recently, caused regulatory
agencies to focus their resources elsewhere.
Id.
61

See Flannery, supra note 60, §15.02; see, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27) (1994). The United States

Code defines the term "solid waste" as follows:
[A]ny garbage, refuse, sludge from a waste treatment plant, or air pollution control
facility and other discarded material, including, solid, liquid, semi-solid, or
contained gaseous material resulting from industrial, commercial, mining and
agricultural operations, and from community activities, but does not include solid
or dissolved material in domestic sewage, or solid or dissolved material in
irrigation return flows or industrial discharges which are point sources subject to
permits.
Id.
62 Id.; cf Flannery & Poland, Hazardous Waste Management Act -

Closing the Circle, 84 W. VA. L.

REv. 347 (1982).
- 42 U.S.C. § 6921(b)(2)(A) (1980); see 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921-6939e. See generallyFlannery & Poland,
supra note 62, at 362-63 n.87 (stating that duplication between, inter alia,state oil and gas laws and
state hazardous waste law to be avoided); Flannery, supra note 60, § 15.02 (discussing oil and gas
exemption to RCRA, Subtitle C).
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For example, selected waste and water pollution
program requirements.
requirements are enforced within the oil and gas regulatory program, inter alia,
permitting and contamination of fresh water sources.' To the extent this is done,
it simplifies enforcement into one regulatory program. Finally, the oil and gas
regulatory enforcement apparatus contains several specific time limits - for
example, a seven day requirement to respond to notice of violation,6" and a five day
requirement for delay between notice and hearing.66 The multiple time limits, when
applied to the multiple opportunities to request review,' can foster speedy resolution
A "thumbnail"
of issues arising out of oil and gas regulatory requirements.
description of selected state oil and gas regulatory apparatus follows.
B.

Regulations

1.

Inspector Enforcement

An oil and gas inspector who observes a violation of the regulatory program
requirements is required to post notice of the violation on the well and to send a
copy to the operator and the operator's agent. 69 "[D]etailed description of the
conditions which cause and constitute such violation" will also be included in the
notice. 70 The operator is normally given seven days to abate the violation, but the
inspector may extend such period up to thirty days for good cause. 71 Each violation

See, e.g. W. VA. CODE § 22-6-7 (1994) (providing for water pollution control permits issued by
ChieO; W. VA. CODE § 22-6-35 (1994) (allowing civil action presumption of contamination or
deprivation of a fresh water source or supply); W. VA. CODE STATE R. §§ 38-12-1 to -4 (1996)
(effective date 1993) (providing for solid waste permit issued by Chief by rule if there is compliance
with W. VA. CODE STATE R. § 38-18). In cases where the operator does not obtain the requisite water
pollution or waste permit from the Chief, it should be inferred that the operator is required by the
pertinent water and waste regulatory requirements to obtain a permit under each respective program.
See W. VA. CODE § 22-11-8 (1994) (water); W. VA CODE § 22-15-10 (1994) (waste).
64

65 W. VA. CODE

§ 22-6-3(a) (1994).

See, e.g., W. VA. CODE§ 22-6-28(a) (1994).
67

See, e.g., W. VA. CODE §§ 22-6-4, -5, -28 (1994).

's

Cf W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 17 ("[A]ndjustice shall be administered without... delay.").

69

W. VA. CODE

70

W. VA. CODE § 22-6-3(a) (1994).

71

id.

§§ 22-6-3, -4(1994).
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is directed at discrete circumstances (e.g., failure to reclaim,72 improper plugging,73
failure to post the well number74). The inspector is statutorily authorized to order
the operator to cease and desist operations if the violation is not abated, and the
operator has fifteen days from which to appeal.'
2.

Chief's Complaint

The Chief or other interested party may initiate a complaint.76 True copies
of the complaint are sent to the operator, with notice of the time and place of
hearing.77 The operator is authorized at least five days notice prior to the hearing.'
This procedure is useful to augment enforcement in circumstances where an
inspector's notice of violation has not been issued, or either the Chief or other
interested party identifies an unabated violation. Moreover, this procedure is also
useful for violations that are generally tracked in the central Office of Oil and Gas,
such as, inter alia, failure to report annual production,79 improper transfers"0 and
abandoned wells.8' An operator may
also seek a hearing before the Office of Oil
82
and Gas via the complaint procedure.
' See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 22-6-30 (providing a six month deadline, which may be extended another
six months by the Chief).
73 See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 22-6-24 (describing methods of plugging a well).

' See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 22-6-6(f) (1994).
75 See, e.g., W. VA. CODE §§ 22-6-3(b) to -4(a) (1994); cf W. VA. CODE § 22-6-4(c) (1994) (allowing
the operator to appeal as long as the inspector's order is in effect).
76

W. VA. CODE § 22-6-28(a). An "interested party" is any well operator, coal operator, the director,

or any aggrieved person. Id.
77 id.
78 Id.
79

W. VA. CODE STATE R. § 38-18-15.1 (1996) (effective date July 1, 1993).

So W. VA. CODE § 22-6-26(g) (requiring that before a bond may be released, the director must be
satisfied that the well has fulfilled the bond conditions); W. VA. CODE § 22-6-26(b).
"I W. VA. CODE § 22-6-19.
W. VA. CODE § 22-6-28(a). This opportunity for hearing would appear to be in addition to the
hearing available under procedures in consonance with chapter 22, article 6, section 4 of the West
Virginia Code.
12
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3.

Bond Forfeiture

An operator's bond is required to be forfeited by the Chief of the Office of
Oil and Gas when an operator violates a state requirement beyond the time limit set
by the violation notice.83 Each operator is required to submit to the Chief either a
$5,000.00 single well bond' or a $50,000.00 blanket bond. 85 The bond is a
"performance bond"8 6 submitted to the Chief to guarantee performance of state
requirements;87 and when an operator is not in compliance with those requirements,
the bond is forfeited in its entirety.8 Because the forfeiture is a result of violation
of state requirements, the operator may request review as discussed below.89 The
forfeiture is an administrative consequence of the operator's violation of the state
requirements, and his opportunity for hearing is set forth in the context of response
to the violations.9" The forfeitures are required to be deposited in the special oil and
gas reclamation fund.9'
4.

Penalties and Recompense

The Office of Oil and Gas issues assessments after receiving from an

83

W. VA. CODE § 22-6-2(i) (1994).

84

W. VA. CODE §§ 22-6-26(b), -10-5 (1994) (reducing the single well bond amount from $10,000.00

to $5,000.00).
W. VA. CODE § 22-6-26(c) (1994). The bond requirements may be complied with by additional
means beyond bonds. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 22-6-26(d) (1994).
85

86 W. VA. CODE

§ 22-6-26(b) (cautioning that "conditioned on full compliance with all laws, rules

relating to the drilling, redrilling, deepening, casing and stimulating of oil and gas wells... and to the
plugging, abandonment and reclamation of wells and for furnishing such reports... required").
87 W. VA. CODE §

22-6-26(b).

88 See, e.g., 3A M.J. Bonds § 34 (1996) ("Where a bond is given to a public body as a condition of

license or other privilege, or conditioned upon compliance with law, the full penalty of such bond may
be recovered as in the nature of liquidated damages for its breach, in the absence of express or implied
provisions to the contrary in the statute which prescribes the bond, or in the bond itself.").
' See discussion infra part III.B.5.

90See, e.g., W. VA. CODE STATE R. § 38-19-2.1 (1996) (effective date Oct. 30, 1987) (granting
expansive authorization for hearing).
91 W. VA. CODE §

22-6-26(k) (1994).
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inspector a copy of a notice of an operator's failure to abate a violation.92 Civil
penalties of $2,500.00 per day per violation may also be awarded by a state circuit
court.'
Additionally, after an order by the Chief to plug a well has not been
complied with for thirty days, a circuit court may award a civil penalty of
$25,000.00. 94 Full recompense for costs to reclaim and to plug a well by an
interested party or the Chief is also authorized.'
5.

Hearings

Within fifteen days of notice of failure to abate the violation, an operator
may request review, 96 or, in the alternative, as in the case of a notice of complaint,
the Chief may order a hearing.97 The notice of violation (or notice of hearing) is a
significant event for the operator, in that the violation of the state regulatory
requirements places the operator's bond at risk.9' Moreover, the Chief is authorized
to order other regulatory remedies, such as shutting in a well, 99 plugging a well,"

assessing penalties,'

92

and correcting violations."°

See generally W. VA. GEN. REP.

& OPINIONS, Oct.

Additionally, an operator may

22, 1986, No. 6 (citing State Human Rights

Comm'n v. Pearlman Realty Agency, 175 S.E.2d 145 (W. Va. 1977)).
W. VA. CODE§ 22-6-34(a) (1994) (describing willful violation); see also, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 22-634(b) (1994) (describing criminal punishment).
9

94 W. VA. CODE
"5

§ 22-10-9.

W. VA. CODE §§ 22-6-32, -10-7 (1994).

W. VA. CODE § 22-6-4(a); see also W. VA. CODE STATE R. § 38-19-2.1 (1996) (effective date Oct.
30, 1987) (granting expansive authorization for hearing).
9

97 W. VA. CODE

§ 22-6-28(a).

W. VA. CODE § 22-6-26(i) ("If any of the requirements of this article or rules promulgated pursuant
thereto or the orders of the director have not been complied with within the time limit set by the
violation notice as defined in sections three, four and five [W. VA. CODE §§ 22-6-3, 22-6-4, 22-6-5]
of this article, the performance bond shall then be forfeited.").
"

W. VA. CODE STATER. § 38-18-10.6 (1996) (effective date July 1, 1993).

1o0W. VA CODE § 22-6-19.
10'

W. VA CODE § 22-6-34; see also supra note 92.

102 W. VA CODE

§§ 22-6-3 to -4.
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request hearing on any inspector's order that is still in effect. °3 A third opportunity
for hearing that appears endless in its availability is that an interested party may file
a complaint with the Chiefl 4 A final decision by the Chief after hearing may be
appealed to circuit court, 5 or a rehearing may be requested from the Chief.0 6
Finally, arbitration may be sought to obtain compensation for plugging by an
interested party. 10 7
IV. SELECTED REGULATORY ENFORCEMENT CONSIDERATIONS

A.

OperatorshipDeterminations

It is useful to determine the identity of the operator of any well when
pursuing well compliance with mining safety requirements, and with counterpart oil
and gas requirements. One reason is that many of the requirements affecting a
determination of operatorship of an oil and gas well0 8 can also affect the coal
operator. Another reason is that when a coal operator also operates a coalbed
methane well, the requirements determining oil and gas operatorship can directly
regulate the coalbed methane operator.0 9
Oil and gas operatorship determinations can be examined in terms of state

§ 22-6-4(c).

103

W. VA. CODE

1'4

W. VA. CODE § 22-6-28 (1994).

103W. VA CODE § 22-6-5.
106 See, e.g., W. VA. CODE §§ 22-6-4(c); see generally W. VA. CODE STATE R. § 38-19-2.13; cf W.
VA. R. Civ. P. 59, 60 (setting forth notions of equity which may be argued to the chief when requesting
rehearing).
'07

W. VA. CODE § 22-10-8 (1994).

10 See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 22-6-5 (stating notices of findings sent to operator). The aforesaid notices
are sent to the operator because West Virginia's regulatory program focuses upon well development,
rather than lease development. Pierce & Flanery, supra note 56, § 19.11 [b].
..
9 See, e.g., W. VA. CODE §§ 22-21-3(d) (1994) (identifying the oil and gas requirements that apply
to coalbed methane).
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requirements for registration, " financial responsibility,"' and transfer of wells. 12
Registration requirements are foundational to the state regulatory program, in that
the wells and the parties to be regulated may be identified. Financial responsibility
requirements provide a method by which operators guarantee their performance of
the state regulatory requirements; the financial responsibility requirements are a
focal point for operatorship determinations in the context of requests for release
from bonding responsibility in conjunction with transfers," 3 bond forfeitures," 4 and
abandoned wells." 5 Transfer requirements are a focal point in operatorship
determinations, in that operator and well compliance with state oil and gas
regulatory requirements is necessary for a bond to be released from a well that
6
another operator has purchased."
1.

Registration

Registration of operators and wells in the oil and gas context serves as a
means by which the state may identify (1) the parties to be regulated and (2) the
wells to be regulated. Other issues related to registration include - inter alia,
applications for permits, requests for transfers, submissions of bonds, and
designations of agents. Registration, while similar to ownership, can be different
- in that it is the operator" 7 that initiates registration (e.g., seeking permit for well
work". and seeking release of financial responsibility for wells it transfers), "' and
.oSee, e.g., supra note 12.
.' See, e.g., supra note 13; cf Pierce & Flanery, supra note 56, § 19.12[g] (allowing that a ward of
the state can be a foundling under water pollution enforcement).
"' See, e.g., supra note 14.
".. See, e.g.,
"4

W. VA. CODE § 22-6-26(h).

See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 22-6-26(i).

'

See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 22-6-19.

1i6

See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 22-6-26(g).

See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 22-6-1(w) (1994) ("[Olperator means any person or persons, firm,
partnership, partnership association or corporation that proposes to or does locate, drill, operate or
abandon any well.").
"7

"' See generally W. VA. CODE § 22-6-6 (1994).
"9 See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 22-6-26(h) (1994).
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it is primarily the operator that exercises the rights and obtains the obligations in the
Thus, it is important to
context of state oil and gas regulatory requirements. 2
private contractual
with
involved
distinguish the operator's private rights
acquisitions from the operator's governmental requirements involved with
registration of the operator and the well. For instance, private contractual or tortious
2
liability for plugging a well may turn on an operator's private agreements,' '
whereas responsibility for regulatory penalties and other regulatory requirements for
a well may turn on the state record of registered operators."2 Of course, private
agreements can be drafted to assign contractual responsibility for some economic
risk of regulatory consequences, and operational regulatory responsibilities may turn
on an operator's private contractual terms as well."2 But, regardless of private
agreements, state regulatory requirements are authorized to be imposed upon
regulated operators.'24
a.

Regulatory Requirements

Chapter 22, article 6, section 6 of the West Virginia Code requires all
persons, prior to beginning well work,"2 to obtain a permit from the director. 126 The
applicant is required to provide the names and addresses of (i) the well operator, (ii)
the agent who shall be the attorney-in-fact for the operator and who shall be a
resident of the state of West Virginia upon whom notices, orders or other
communications issued pursuant to chapter 21, article 22 of the West Virginia Code
may be served and upon whom process may be served, and (iii) all other persons the
applicant must notify under the law, as well as evidence and required documentation

121

Accord Pierce & Flanery, supra note 56, § 19.11 [b].

.2.See generallyTammy J. Owen, Selected Legal Issues Concerningthe Transfer of Operatorshipof
Oil and Gas Properties,14 E. MIN. L. INST. § 24 (1993); Donnell, supra note 10, § 20.03.
'2

Cf Pierce & Flanery, supra note 56, § 19.11 [b].

,23See discussion infra part IV.A.3.b.(ii).
124

Id.

" Well work is defined as "drilling, redrilling, deepening, stimulating, pressuring by injection of any
fluid, converting from one type of well to another, combining or physically changing to allow the
migration of fluid from one formation to another, or plugging or replugging of any well." W. VA.
CODE § 22-6-1(v) (1994).
126Pursuant to the West Virginia Code, this function is delegated to the Chief of the Office of Oil and

Gas. W. VA. CODE § 22-1-7(4) (1994).
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of service of such notice.127 The West Virginia Code of State Regulations states:
[a]ll persons owning or operating or proposing to own or operate
any well in West Virginia shall register with the Chief. In all cases
an agent or attorney in fact shall be designated on Form OP-I,
'Designation of Agent by Well Owner or Operator' . . . but the

designation shall not be effective until it has been accepted in
writing by the Designee and approved by the Office [of Oil and
28
Gas].
Enforcement of state regulatory requirements is substantially dependent
upon registration. 12 Inspectors generally initiate regulatory action by their
inspection. The inspectors must be able to notify operators, agents, owners and
other interested parties of the results of their inspections, and of any violations of
state law.' 30 The notice provisions of chapter 22, article 6, sections 3 to 5 of the
West Virginia Code depend upon accurate and current registration to effectuate the
enforcement system of violations,' 3 ' abatements, 132 penalties,'33 hearings, ' and
orders'35 - each of which involves notice to interested parties.
Importantly, the registration requirements of the state oil and gas regulatory
program place the burden upon the regulated entity to register, 36 and the

127 W. VA.

CODE § 22-6-6.

128 W. VA.

CODE STATER. § 38-18-10.3.1 (1996).

129 Cf

W. VA. CODE § 22-6-6(i) (1994) ("Any person who violates any provision of this section shall

be guilty of a misdemeanor, and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than five thousand
dollars, or be imprisoned in the county jail not more than twelve months, or both fined and
imprisoned.").
130Cf W. VA. CODE § 22-6-6.
131

See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 22-6-3.

132 See,

e.g., W. VA. CODE § 22-6-3(b) (1994).

133See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 22-6-34.

134See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 22-6-28; W. VA. CODE STARER. §§ 38-19-1 to -3 (1996) (effective date
Oct. 30, 1987).
135 See, e.g., W. VA. CODE §§ 22-6-3 to -5.

136See, e.g., W. VA. CODE §§ 22-6-6, -26 (1994) (dealing with permits and bonds).
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enforcement apparatus 137 is designed to penalize entities that do not comply with that
burden.
b.

Discussion

An unknown residual of over 125 years of oil and gas development exists
(going back over fifty years before the first registry contained in the first permitting
statute in 1929)138 - encompassing an unknown total number of wells and
operators. The contemporary oil and gas regulatory program contains several
requirements to foster registration. These requirements include not only the
requirements to register,1 39 but also complementary requirements, for example,
regarding financial responsibility, 40 regarding transfer, 141
and regarding
enforcement. 42 These complementary requirements foster registration by enhancing
the timely accuracy of the Office of Oil and Gas records as each requirement is
processed.
Enforcement of the registration requirements arises in several contexts. For
example, those who do not register are subject to, inter alia, criminal and civil
penalties. 43 Beyond the act of registration, the record of registration is important

'

See, e.g., W. VA. CODE §§ 22-6-26(i), 34 (covering bond forfeiture willful violation).

131See generally Pierce & Flanery, supra note 56, § 19.01.
139See, e.g., supra note 110.
140

See, e.g., supra note 111.

141

See, e.g., supra note 112.

142

See, e.g., supra notes 135 -37.

143 See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 22-6-6(i) ("Any person who violates any provision of this section shall
be guilty of a misdemeanor, and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than five thousand
dollars, or be imprisoned in the county jail not more than twelve months, or both fined and
imprisoned"); W. VA. CODE § 22-6-34(a) ("Any person ... who willfully violates any provision of
this article or any rule or order promulgated hereunder shall be subject to a civil penalty not exceeding
two thousand five hundred dollars. Each day a violation continues after notice by the division
constitutes a separate offense."); W. VA. CODE § 22-6-34(b)). Chapter 22, article 6, section 34(b)
provides:
[alny person ... willfully violating any of the provisions of this article which
prescribe the manner of drilling and casing or plugging and filling any well, or
which prescribe the methods of conserving gas from waste, shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor, and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by a fine not
exceeding five thousand dollars, or imprisonment in jail for not exceeding twelve
months, or both, in the discretion of the court
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for identifying operators when violations are processed, such as failure to plug an
abandoned well. In such case, the notice of violation may stimulate effort by an
operator to update a registration that had not been previously changed. Thus, in the
context of enforcement, such violations can lead not only to review by the Office of
Oil and Gas, but also to review by interested operators; and the results of those
reviews can affect the information contained in Office of Oil and Gas records. In
another example, the opposite contexts - involving either (1) an operator seeking
to register a well in which another operator has an interest or (2) an operator having
a well that another operator seeks to register - can change a registration record,
depending upon compliance with the regulatory requirements for transfer.'44
The extensive list of wells and operators in West Virginia, active or not, is
compiled in West Virginia by the Office of Oil and Gas by using a computer-based
data bank to, inter alia, review wells, transfers, and compliance. The regulatory
requirements for this data bank are designed to maintain contemporaneous accuracy
by requiring contemporaneous input from the regulated community.'45 Prior to
1993, however, experience with the data bank as it then existed revealed a need to
improve the timely accuracy of the records. As a result, the procedures by which
the Office of Oil and Gas now pursues timely accuracy for these records contains,
essentially, preliminary notice of request to transfer to pertinent operators, followed
by a fifteen-day period for comment and opportunity to request hearing.'4 6 During
this period, interested operators or other interested entities may also comment or
request hearing before the Office of Oil and Gas.' 47 The Office of Oil and Gas will
conduct its review during a period of sixty days. However, if reason to delay or
deny registration arises, it is incumbent upon the interested parties to resolve the
problem - e.g., by administrative processes, or by requesting hearing, or by other
remedies. 148

Id.
144

See, e.g., W. VA. CODE STATE R. §§ 38-18-10.3 to -10.7 (1996) (effective date July 1, 1993).

"'

See, e.g., W. VA. CODE STATER. § 38-18-10.5 (1996) (effective date July 1, 1993).

146

Id.

147 id.

4' Id. These remedies can arise, inter alia, in hearing, before hearing, and otherwise in discussion
between the parties. Cf, e.g., L. SKEEN, OIL AND GAS LAW OF KENTUCKY, VIRGiNIA AND WEST
VIRGINIA, § 7:12 at 7-35 to 7-38 (2d ed. 1994) (providing practical analysis of conflict between
regulatory requirements and private transactions). Compare W. VA. CODE § 22-6-19 (stating that well
presumed abandoned for regulatory purposes after 12 months without use, and required to be promptly
plugged) with W. VA. CODE § 36-4-9a (providing a rebuttable presumption that an operator that fails
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c.

Old Well Registration

As commercial production for a well winds down, the question arises as to
who is going to plug the well.'49 As discussed above, many of those wells are
currently unknown and concomitantly unregistered. Therefore, registration provides
a means by which to approach identification of entities required to plug these wells.
The Office of Oil and Gas is currently embarked on an innovative "Hunt for
Abandoned Wells" that is aimed at finding unregistered wells. 5 Abandoned wells
can involve potential and realized harm throughout the state, including, inter alia,
explosions, contamination of water, injury - and a resultant "who is responsible?"
question.' 5 ' Thus, a consequence of the "Hunt for Abandoned Wells" could involve
a hunt for the operators of the old wells.' 52
A related issue to which a registry system can bring focus is the issue of
prior insufficient plugging.'53 In a search for a responsible party, the registry records

to produce for a period greater than 24 months constitutes intent to abandon the leasehold estate).
,49 See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 22-6-19; cf. SKEEN, supra note 148, at 7-34 ("Prior to this legislation,
regulation of the oil and gas industry in the state was piecemeal and almost nonexistent. Many
depleted wells, having no salvage value, were simply abandoned by the operators without plugging
because no sanctions existed to punish such conduct or to require compliance.").
HUNT FOR ABANDONED WELLS, supra note 9. The "Hunf' involves, first, a contest for the public
in which prizes are offered for identifying abandoned wells and, second, a recognition program for
operators to likewise identify abandoned wells. Id.
150

'5' Cf IDLE OIL AND GAS WELLS, supra note 52, at 92 (stating that the potential for groundwater
contamination can be a primary environmental concern.); Streit Interview, supra note 50 (describing
explosion). But see Snyder & Christian, supranote 5, § 5.02[1 ][b] [i] (stating that there are no known
explosions from leakage from oil and gas wells, but the potential for such explosion should still be
considered).

See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 22-10-6 (1994) (providing a means by which the state may approach
priorities to plug these abandoned wells). The fund is not nearly adequate, however, and responsible
parties, to the extent that enforcement is viable, will necessarily be required under the West Virginia
Code to comply with the requirement to plug. W. VA. CODE § 22-6-19. One approach may be found
in the West Virginia Code involving procedures to plug and recompense. W. VA. CODE § 22-10-7; see
also IDLE OIL AND GAS WELLS, supra note 52, at 73 (providing one estimate that "[a]bout 65,000 preregulatory wells exist in West Virginia").
152

1' Cf., e.g., W. VA. CODE § 22-6-24(e).
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can be useful to identify responsible parties if the plug later proves insufficient. 154
For the responsible party, the requirement to properly plug an abandoned well is not
vitiated by prior insufficient plugging.'55 Importantly, interested parties, including
the Chief, are authorized to plug, or replug any previously insufficiently plugged
well, then seek recompense under chapter 22, article 10, sections 7 and 8 of the West
Virginia Code.
Nor should it be argued that the state assumed the civil liability for the
previously plugged - but not sufficiently - wells. Although the state has created
a fund to plug old wells, 56 the state is authorized to seek various statutory remedies,
as well as to seek recompense via traditional and axiomatic remedies from the party
57
that failed to plug or insufficiently plugged.
In contrast, contemporaneous bond responsibility may be released for wells
properly plugged in accordance with current law.'58 However, until such release is
granted by the Chief in each individual case for each individual well, the operator's
bonding responsibilities continue. 9 Bonding release for a well does not, however,
release an operator from the requirement to plug properly, and an operator whose
plug proves insufficient continues to be required to plug properly and is required to

151

Cf Atkinson v. West Virginia Oil & Gas Co., 79 S.E. 647 (W. Va. 1913) (involving failure of

owner of abandoned well to plug or prevent injury to neighboring well).

'51 See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 22-10-7 (f)(1994) ("[A]ny interested
person who plugs or replugs such
well pursuant to the provisions of this section may recover from the owner or operator of such well all
reasonable costs incidental to such plugging or replugging, including any compensation provided for
in this section."). Compare, e.g., W. VA. CODE §§ 22-6-23, -24 with HUNT FOR ABANDONED WELLS,
supra note 9.

See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 22-6-29 (1994) (setting forth reclamation fund); see also W. VA. CODE
§ 22-10-6 (establishing priority for expending the fund). This fund is susceptible to insufficiency, in
that one estimate of wells plugged per year by the fund is 20. WEST VIRGINIA STATE REVIEW, supra
note 56, at 17.
156

57 E.g., W. VA. CODE § 22-10-7 to -9, -11 (describing various remedies). See generally Shostak,
supra note 10; Donnell, supra note 10; Mitchell, supra note 48.

See W. VA. CODE § 22-6-26(g) (stating that improperly plugged wells would not be released, if
known, because it is a violation); W. VA. CODE § 22-6-19 (requiring proper plugging); W. VA. CODE
§ 22-10-4(a) (1994) (requiring bonding of all wells); W. VA. CODE § 22-6-26(b) (providing bond
requirements).
'5"

"5The basis for release is the director's satisfaction that the bond conditions and oil and gas regulatory
laws, orders, regulations, rules, and other requirements of the director have been fully performed. W.
VA. CODE § 22-6-26(g).
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demonstrate again financial responsibility and to plug again the well. 6 '
Another issue to which a registry can bring focus involves whether the
private contracts of private parties absolve operators registered under the statutorily
mandated registry from compliance with the laws dependent upon such registry.
Consider an entity that registered but, since registration, sold its private rights.
Should the original operator be able to argue that the state should not enforce the
law against him, as opposed to the person to whom the original operator transferred
the private rights? Or should the Office of Oil and Gas require the currently
registered operator - even if that operator has entered into a private transaction to
transfer with a subsequent operator - to be responsible for compliance with the
state regulatory program? The regulatory answer to these questions is that the
transferor operator is not relieved of his responsibilities until the transfer is approved
161
by the Chief.
Moreover, the regulatory program requires those who transfer private
operatorship rights to notify the Chief and request approval.' 6
However, there is no regulatory prohibition from private parties to include
in their contracts provisions for indemnity and risk financing to maintain compliance
with their regulatory duties. Private parties have means to protect their interests in
private contracts, and protection from liability for failure to comply with
governmental regulatory requirements is an important consideration for parties that
would seek to avoid effecting, on their own, compliance with the law. Of course,
the private contractual remedies do not absolve regulated parties from regulatorymandated responsibilities, but private remedies can at least allocate reimbursement
responsibilities. 63

160

See generally W. VA. CODE § 22-6-26 (requiring bonding); W. VA. CODE § 22-6-19 (requiring

plugging). Moreover, failure to plug and improper plugging are continuing violations. Cf Pro Gas,
Inc. v. Har-Ken Oil Co., 883 S.W.2d 485, 488 (Ky. 1994) (involving Kentucky statutory interpretation
that assignee takes continuing responsibility to plug or bond). See generally Handley v. Town of
Shinnston, 289 S.E.2d 201, 202 (W. Va. 1982), 54 C.J.S. Limitations ofActions § 169 (1948); Patrick
v. Sharon Steel Corp., 549 F. Supp. 1259, 1264-66 (N.D.W. Va. 1982).
161 W.

VA. CODE STATE R. § 38-18-10.3.2 (1996) (effective date July 1, 1993).

162 E.g.,
163 See

W. VA. CODE STATE R. § 38-18-10.3 (1996) (effective date July 1, 1993).

also W. VA. CODE §§ 22-6-31 (involving prevention of the waste of gas); W. VA. CODE § 22-

10-7 (stating that interested person may plug). Both provisions provide means for reimbursement; cf
supra note 148, at 7-35 (providing practical analysis of conflict between regulatory
requirements and private transactions). See generally Shostak, supra note 10; Donnell, supra note 10;
Mitchell, supra note 48.
SKEEN,
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Financial Responsibility
a.

Statutory Requirements

Chapter 22, article 6, section 26 of the West Virginia Code sets forth the
requirements for performance bond or other form of financial responsibility suitable
for the same purpose. "The form of the bond required by this article shall be
approved by the director and may include, at the option of the operator, surety
bonding... letters of credit, establishment of an escrow account, self-bonding or a
combination of these methods."I' ' 4 The bond will be "conditioned on full
compliance with all laws, rules relating to the drilling, redrilling, deepening, casing
and stimulating of oil and gas wells ... and to the plugging, abandonment and
reclamation of wells and' 65for furnishing such reports and information as may be
required by the director.'
The standard for performance is that the bond is required to be forfeited
"[i]f any of the requirements of this article or rules promulgated pursuant thereto or
the orders of the director have not been complied with within the time limit set by
the violation notice."' 66
The traditional focus of the bond requirement has been that "[n]o permit
shall be issued ...unless a bond ...is or has been furnished,, ' 67 and "[i]t is
unlawful for any person to commence any well work.., without first securing from
the director a well work permit."' 68 A single well bond 69 or a blanket bond 7 ° is
required. Chapter 22, article 10, section 5 of the West Virginia Code reduced the
single well bond requirement amount from ten thousand dollars to five thousand
'" W. VA. CODE § 22-6-26(d); see also IDLE OIL AND GAS WELLS, supra note 52, at 109 (encouraging
states to adopt programs similar to that of West Virginia).
165

W. VA. CODE § 22-6-26(b).

j66 W. VA. CODE

§ 22-6-26(i); see W. VA. CODE §§ 22-6-3 to -5 (setting forth procedure for setting

the time limits). For discussion of the regulatory apparatus for issuing notices of violation, failure to
abate, hearing and bond forfeiture, see supra part III.B.
167 W. VA.
168

CODE § 22-6-26(a) (1994).

W. VA. CODE § 22-6-6(a).

Well work includes "drilling, redrilling, deepening, stimulating,

pressuring by injection of any fluid, converting from one type of well to another, combining or
physically changing to allow the migration of fluid from one formation to another or plugging or
replugging of any well." W. VA. CODE § 22-6-1(v).
169 W. VA. CODE § 22-6-26(b).

'

W. VA CODE § 22-6-26(c).
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dollars;' ' the amount of the blanket bond requirement remained at fifty thousand
dollars.172 Most importantly, chapter 22, article 10, section 4 of the West Virginia
Code also added the requirement that all wells must be bonded. 73 This change
expanded the bonding requirement to wells previously not required to be bonded.
Thus, wells that might not have been bonded previously - for instance, those that
were being used by private home owners for "free gas" or were otherwise not
operating - are now required by chapter 22, article 10, sections 4 and 5 of the West
Virginia Code to be bonded. This enhanced performance bond requirement
enhances financial responsibility for plugging wells. 74
b.

Selected Financial Responsibility Considerations
i.

Blanket Bonds

The requirement to bond is usually satisfied with a blanket bond. 75 Blanket
bonds are used by operators to cover several wells at a time and to cover several
types of well work at a time. 76 For instance, it is possible for an operator to have
over a hundred wells in production, and all of them covered by a single blanket
bond. Similarly, some operators simultaneously work at different aspects of "well
work" - all requiring bond coverage (such as, one well under permit to drill,"
another well under permit for coalbed methane gas,'78 another well under general

'7'

W. VA. CODE§ 22-10-5.

i7

Id.

'7

W. VA. CODE§§ 22-10-4 (1994).

" To the extent that more wells might be bonded, and therefore more likely to be able to comply with
more plugging requirements of chapter 22, article 6, section 19 of the West Virginia Code, the state
burden to assume plugging under chapter 22, article 10, section 6 of the West Virginia Code may be
leavened.
' See W. VA. CODE § 22-6-26(c).
See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 22-6-26(c); cf Flannery & Beckett, Abandoned Well Regulatory
Initiatives: An Examination ofRecently EnactedLegislationin the Eastern UnitedStates 14 E. MIN.
L. INST. § 20.04[1][a] (1993).
176

171See

W. VA. CODE §§ 22-6-6, -26 (dealing with permit and bond).

'' See W. VA. CODE §§ 22-21-6, -8 (dealing with permit and bond).
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operations in production,' 79 and another well under permit to plug). 0
In order to maintain a bond on a well, or during the regulatory processing
period for review and approval of transfer, one operator may find that it is operating
a well with another operator's bond on the well.'' To the extent that no violations
arise during the pendency of the transfer or as a result of the transfer,8 2 the
transferor operator may not be adversely affected. However, to the extent that such
violation would arise, the regulatory requirements to abate the violation place the
8 3 or other penalties' 4 for the other party's
bonding party at risk of bond forfeiture"
violations. Beyond penalties, the significance to the bonding party is not only the
forfeiture of its fifty thousand dollar bond (which, possibly, could be secured by a
home or other assets), but also the regulatory requirement that the loss of the bond
means that all of his other well work (which performance was formerly guaranteed
by the forfeited bond) may be required to cease 85 because, after forfeiture, that
performance is no longer guaranteed by the forfeited bond. 6 Of course, the
operator faces the same potential forfeiture issues when its own wells are found to
be in violation of West Virginia oil and gas regulatory requirements.
The regulatory efficacy of the blanket bond authorization is useful in the
context of operators that maintain profitable and expanding business. If one uses an
estimate that the average cost to plug a well for the Office of Oil and Gas is
approximately ten thousand dollars,'87 it is a likely shortfall-in-the-making to try to

179 See W. VA. CODE§

22-10-4.

180Id.
"' See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 22-6-26(h) (stating that notice by transferor required no later than five
days after assignment).
182

But see, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 22-10-4(a) (revealing that transfer to someone without a bond would

result in an immediate violation of the bonding requirement for all wells).
83

See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 22-6-26(i).

'8' See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 22-6-34 (covering willful violation and criminal penalties).
8

See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 22-6-3(b) (dealing with inspector requirement to require operator "to

cease further operations").
186 Compare W.

VA. CODE § 22-6-4(a) (requiring a bond).

187 WEST VIRGINIA STATE REVIEw supra note 56, at 21; cf. Interview with James A. Martin, Jr.,

Geologist, Office of Oil and Gas, West Virginia Division of Environmental Protection (November 19,
1996) [hereinafter Martin interview] (relating that recent experience at the Office of Oil and Gas has
been that the Office's plugging costs have been approximately $30,000.00 per well).
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stretch a fifty thousand dollar bond, when forfeited, to plug more than five wells.
On the other hand, a profitable and expanding oil and gas business may fund, by its
revenues, the plugging of commercially unprofitable wells, each in its turn, as each
well reaches that end point in its production life - by using the profits from the
wells it operates at more profitable points in their productive lives.
The rub, however, is that the normal productive life of a well may involve
a series of transfers of operatorship from operators with high production costs to
succeeding operators with less production costs - until the wells that need plugging
are susceptible to gather at the end of the economic chain with operators which
operate on increasingly limited financial means from the income (if any) generated
by the comparatively less productive wells they operate. Blanket bonds for several
wells at the end of the productive life of a well are therefore susceptible to being less
likely to sufficiently guarantee performance of the oil and gas regulatory
requirements, particularly the increased likelihood of plugging required for
nonproducing wells. 8'
ii.

Single Well Bonds

At $5,000.00 per well,'89 the single well bond is less expensive in the
obvious circumstance where the operator has only one well. This circumstance may
arise in the context of free house gas or in the context of a one-well operator.
One regulatory issue that arises in the context of the free house gas well is
the question of who is responsible as the operator.' 90 This issue arises because,
while a commercial operator may be willing to guarantee financial responsibility
and to guarantee performance of the state requirements for a free house gas well on
his bond, a commercial operator is not authorized to do so because the free house
gas is not authorized as production in a commercial quantity.19 ' In essence, a well

188
See W. VA. CODE § 22-6-19; see also V. BEGHINI, MARGINAL WELLS: A REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL PETROLEUM COuNcIL 3 (1994) (cautioning that low prices can also endanger wells at the

end of their productive life); Snyder & Christian, supranote 5, § 5.03[3][c] (stating that the aim of the
coal production interests regarding this statutory provision was to discourage evasion of the duty to
plug and to prevent numerous nonproducing wells from remaining unplugged and "therefore
eliminating the possibility of mining through such wells").
"'

W. VA. CODE § 22-10-5.

19oSee, e.g., W. VA. CODE §§ 22-6-3 to -5 (directing that notice of violations go to the operator).
191W. VA. CODE STATE R. § 38-21-2.14 (1996) (effective date July 1, 1993).
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is required to produce in a commercial quantity, 92 such as for financial benefit 9
in order to satisfy the state regulatory production requirement. 94 Consequently, the
significance of free house gas, in terms of absence of production in commercial
quantities, is that a commercial operator is required by chapter 22, article 6, section
19 of the West Virginia Code to plug the well. As discussed above, 95 violation of
this statutory requirement to produce or plug can, if the violation is not timely
abated, 9 6 lead to forfeiture of the operator's bond'97 and require cessation of the
operator's other production.' 98
On the other hand, if the operator receives economic benefit from the well
- such as when the homeowner is the operator - a single well bond can be viable.
For example, when the homeowner recipient of the free gas places the well under
his bond, the well is not abandoned because the homeowner receives economic
benefit, and the plugging requirement of chapter 22, article 6, section 19 of the West
Virginia Code (and therefore the prospect of bond forfeiture for having abandoned
the well) would not arise on the basis of free gas to the homeowner.
A second example of viable single well bond use arises when an operator
chooses to bond each well separately. This example could arise in the following two
contexts. First, an operator that operates one well would need only a single well
bond. Second, bonding each well separately protects separate investors from
separate problems (for instance, bond forfeiture, regulatory penalties, or other
operational expenses) associated with wells other than those in which each specific
investor has specifically contributed to finance.
A third example of possible single well bond use arises in the context of
well transfer. When an operator desires to transfer a well that has not produced in
commercial quantities in the previous twelve months, chapter 22, article 6, section
19 of the West Virginia Code requires the operator to produce or plug. Unless

192

E.g., W. VA. CODE STATE R. §§ 38-21-2.3, -4.1 (1996) (effective date July 1, 1993).

193 See

W. VA. CODE STATE R. § 38-21-2.14 (1996) (effective date July 1, 1993) (involving beneficial

economic use).
194 See, e.g. , W. VA. CODE § 22-6-19 (requiring any well not producing for 12 consecutive months

to be plugged).
"9 See discussion supra part IV.A.2.b.
W. VA. CODE § 22-6-3(b) (stating that normally, "[a] reasonable time not to exceed seven days,"
which may be extended to 30 days).
'96

197 W. VA. CODE

'98

§ 22-6-26(i).

See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 22-10-4 (requiring bond for all wells).
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compliance with this requirement can be achieved, the Chief is not authorized to
approve transfer.' The operator, to obtain the Chiefs approval of a proposed
transfer, is required to achieve compliance with state regulatory requirements. The
operator, therefore, may consider whether (1) to produce the well, then transfer;"'
(2) to plug the well,2"' or (3) to enter into an agreed order with the Chief to attain
compliance.2"'
iii

Bond Forfeitures

The performance bond is required to be forfeited when "any of the
requirements of this article [chapter 22, article 6 of the West Virginia Code] or rules
promulgated pursuant thereto or the orders of the director have not been complied
with within the time limit set by the violation notice."20'3 All forfeitures are to be
deposited in the oil and gas special reclamation fund, 2" which is used to "reclaim
and properly plug wells." 20 5 The full amount of the bond or other financial security

9 See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 22-6-26(g) (requiring compliance).
200Accord W. VA. CODE § 22-6-19.
201

20

Id.
See W. VA. CODE § 22-6-4 (granting authority to issue orders); W. VA. CODE STATER. § 38-22-7

(1996) (effective date July 1, 1993) (providing for schedule to plug wells); see also W. VA. CODE
STATE R. § 38-21-4.1.27 (1996) (effective date July 1, 1993) (authorizing escrow to plug). Another
alternative may be to place the well upon a single well bond, under a demonstration of bona fide future
use. Escrow of funds (such as the single well bond) is one of the factors to consider when applying
for a bona fide future use, and, when presented by an operator in conjunction with other items listed
in the regulatory requirements may, on a case by case basis, be proffered in request for approval for
bonafide future use. W. VA. CODE STATE R. § 38-21-4.1.27 (1996) (effective date July 1, 1993). The
operator may seek inactive status by applying to the Chief. This status is, however, granted by the
Chief to individual applicant operators on the basis of specific representations by the applicant
operator. Thus the Chief's grant of inactive status on the basis of representations of bona fide future
use are not transferrable. Inactive status due to a bona fide use can delay compliance with the
"produce or plug" requirement for a maximum period of five years. See generally infra part IV.B.
203 W. VA. CODE §

22-6-26(i).

W. VA. CODE § 22-6-26(k). One estimate is that forfeited instruments provide an annual amount
of one hundred thousand to six hundred thousand dollars. WEST VIRGINIA STATE REVIEW, supra note
56, at 21.
204

205 W. VA. CODE

§ 22-6-29(b) (1994).
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Importantly, bond forfeiture is not a substitute for statutory

expenses incurred in
penalties," recompense for reclamation or plugging,20 8
compliance with lawful requirements under the oil and gas regulatory program,2°9
in compliance with lawful orders210 or in compliance with injunctive relief.2 "
Neither the bond forfeiture nor other remedy is required by the regulatory program
to be reduced by the fact that another remedy is also effected; each of the foregoing
regulatory components may occur either separately or in addition to the others.
Additionally, as discussed above, an operator's assets can become
susceptible to recovery efforts by the bond holder.21 2 And every well under an
operator's forfeited blanket bond is consequently no longer authorized to operate
until new bond is approved by the Chief.2" 3 Further consequence can be more
violations,2 14 and more exposure to penalties for the regulatory violations.
7

3.

Transfer

Transfer is a concept in the regulatory program that complements the private
contractual dealings and movement of title and rights and obligations between
operators, other contractual parties, and the Chief. As the West Virginia Code of
State Regulations state:
When title to a well or the right to operate a well is transferred from
one (1) well operator to another, the Chief shall be notified in
writing within five (5) days by the transferor well operator, or if he

206

W. VA. CODE § 22-6-26. Although some may argue that a total forfeiture is a penalty and is more

in the nature of a penalty bond, the statute is explicit in its terminology as a performance bond. Id.
Moreover, the statute is explicit in its description of the required conditions, that compliance with the
oil and gas regulatory requirements is the performance that is guaranteed by the bond. Id.
207

See, e.g., W. VA. CODE §§ 22-6-34, -10-9 (1994).

208

See, e.g., W. VA. CODE §§ 22-6-32, -10-7, and-10-8 (1994).

209 See
210

W. VA. CODE

§ 22-6-28.

See W. VA. CODE §§ 22-6-3 to -5, -28.

21 W. VA. CODE

§ 22-6-39.

212

See discussion infra part IV.A.2.b. 1.

213

See generally W. VA. CODE

214

E.g., W. VA. CODE §§ 22-10-4 to -5.

§ 22-10-4.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol99/iss3/6

32

Hill: Oil and Gas Regulatory Considerations for Coal, Oil and Gas Opera
19971

SELECTED REGULATORYISSUES

no longer exists by one or more of the owners of the well, the name
and address of the transferee well operator. 215
The transferee is then required to register with the Chief."6 However,
[n]o assignment or transfer by the transferor owner shall relieve the
transferor well owner of any obligation and liabilities pursuant to
these rules or West Virginia Code 22 or 22B unless and until the
Office of Oil and Gas accepts and then notifies the transferee and
transferor as outlined in Section 10.4 that they have complied with
section 10.217
Operators that enter into private contracts to transfer their rights to other
operators would generally also want to remove their regulatory compliance
responsibility for the wells. However, a private transfer does not necessarily mean
that the Chief is authorized to approve the transfer of the well to the transferee's
bond.
Consider the following regulatory circumstances: First, the regulatory
program requires that the transferor notify the Chief within five days after the
sale. 2 8 Because the application to the Chief occurs after the sale, the transferor will
retain responsibility for regulatory compliance beyond the date of sale. Moreover,
the transferee is also required to notify the Chief,21 so the transferor does not control

215

W.VA. CODE STATER.

§ 38-18-10.3.2.1 (1996) (effective date July 1, 1993) ("Failure to notify the

Chief of such transfer shall be a violation of this rule by said transferor and shall be punishable under
W. Va. Code § 22-6-34; and, in addition, all bonds of such transferor under W. Va. Code § 22-6 shall
be forfeited.").
216 W. VA. CODE STATE R.

§ 38-18-10.3.2.2 (1996) (effective date July 1, 1993). The West Virginia

regulations state:
The transferee well operator shall file with the Office on form OP-77 the well
name and the permit number of the subject well, the county and district in which
the subject well is located, the names and addresses of the transferor well owners
or operator and the transferee well operator, a copy of the instrument of
assignment or transfer, or a certification of such assignment or transfer acceptable
to the Chief, and the applicable bond, cash, or collateral security, described in W.
Va.Code § 22-6-26.

Id.
217

W. VA. CODE STATE R. § 38-18-10.4 (1996) (effective date July 1, 1993).

231

E.g., W. VA. CODE

219

Id.

§ 22-6-26(h).
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all of the application requirements. Once the application is complete, the Chief is
required to be satisfied that there is full compliance. Chapter 22, article 6, section
26(g) of the West Virginia Code requires that "[a]ny such bond shall remain in force
until released by the director and the director shall release the same upon satisfaction
that the conditions thereof have been fully performed., 220 The conditions, set forth
in chapter 22, article 6, section 26(b) of the West Virginia Code, require "full
compliance with all laws, rules . . . and to the plugging, abandonment and
reclamation of wells and for fumishing such reports and information as may be
required by the director."' Accordingly, the Chief is not authorized to release a
well from the transferor's bond until he is satisfied that there has been full
compliance with all requirements of the state regulatory program.
Instead of transfer from the transferor's bond, the Chief, in appropriate
circumstances, may accept and hold bonds
or other form of financial responsibility
222
from more than one competing interest.
a.

Transfer Procedures

The request for transfer starts the regulatory review process at the Office of
Oil and Gas.22 3 After an application for transfer is received, the Office of Oil and
Gas will conduct a review of the submitted information (and any other information
2 24
available to it) within sixty (60) days, and prepare a summary report to the Chief.
A file number and a determination date are assigned, and the process for notice and
opportunity to be heard is begun: The transferor and transferee are sent a Periodical
Circular setting forth (a) whether the initial application was complete or incomplete
as received; (b) the scheduled determination date; (c) the date of determination; and,
when appropriate, (d) the date on which the determination order was final.2 z
The circular addressing any given well may be expected to be sent on at
least two occasions: First, a pre-circular is sent notifying the operators that an
220 W. VA. CODE

§22-6-26(g).

221W. VA. CODE

§ 22-6-22(b).

2n W. VA. CODE STATE R. § 38-18-10.7 (1996) (effective date July 1, 1993). For practical purposes,

this option would appear to be the most reasonable. Certainly, if the parties to a transfer do not trust
each other to protect the other's bond, neither should the Chief. Therefore, no bond should be released
until the operators achieve lawful compliance.
223

See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 22-6-26(h).

224

W. VA. CODE STATER. § 38-18-10.5 (1996) (effective date July 1, 1993).

225 W. VA. CODE STATE R. § 38-18-10.5.2 (1996) (effective date July 1, 1993).
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application has been received, and identifying the results of review to date.2 6 Then,
a thirty-day follow-up circular ensues until the final order is issued. 7 A hearing
may be requested by an interested person within fifteen days from the date that the
circular is published. 2
b.

Selected Transfer Considerations
i.

Chiefs Review

The Chief's initial action, upon receipt of the application for transfer, is to
"conduct a review of the submitted data along with other information available."' 229
"Each application shall be on Form OP-77," 30 and "[a] separate application must be
submitted for each well."'" The first part of the application sets forth identifying
information for the well and the transferor. The second part of the application sets
forth identifying information for the transferee, identifying the new operator and

226

The following codes are used in the circular to identify the status of the request for transfer:
A - No agent registered with the Office of Oil and Gas
B - Problem with the new Owner's bond
F - Transfer fee was not received by the Office of Oil and Gas
C - Well is not currently in production
P - Permit for this well has not been released
V - Outstanding violations on this well
D - Transfer was denied based on administrative review of request
0 - Transfer was approved based on administrative review of request
N - New proposed owner violation/failure to abate

W. VA. CODE STATER. § 38-18-10.5.2 (1996) (effective date July 1, 1993).
227

W. VA. CODE STATER. § 38-18-10.5 (1996) (effective date July 1, 1993).

m W. VA. CODE STATE R. § 38-18-10.5.3 (1996) (effective date July 1, 1993). Hearings are processed
as contested cases. Therefore, pursuant to chapter 29A, article 5, section 4 of the West Virginia Code,
the Chief's decision after hearing may also be appealed to the pertinent circuit court as an
administrative appeal.

W. VA. CODE STATE R. § 38-18-10.5.1 (1996) (effective date July 1, 1993). See generally
Flannery,supra note 60. Review by the Chief would appear to be useful to review the compliance
posture of the wells, considering that "the Appalachian region has a large number of wells, but those
wells produce small amounts of oil and gas." Id.
229

230 W. VA. CODE STATE R. § 38-18-10.4.1.5 (1996) (effective date July 1, 1993).
23

W. VA. CODE STATE R. § 38-18-10.4.1.3 (1996) (effective date July 1, 1993).
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agent 32 The Office of Oil and Gas may review its permitting files, bonding and
registration files, violation files, production report files, or any other information
submitted to it or available to it.233
As previously discussed, the Chief's review must determine whether the
well is in compliance with the State regulatory program.2'
This review
encompasses both the compliance posture for the well as it is under the transferor
and the compliance posture for the well as it will be under the transferee. This
procedure can therefore identify wells that may have been in compliance under, for
instance, a grant of inactive status' 5 for the transferor, but would be transferred into
noncompliance with the transferee because inactive status is obtained by application
by an operator who sets forth his proposed "bona fide future use. '236 Thus, inactive
status is not transferable. Accordingly, the Chief's review of requested transfers is
an important extension of the traditional enforcement efforts of the inspectors, 237 in
that the Chief's review can also identify violations of the state regulatory program.
Because the Chief's review can have an effect upon private contractual expectations,
the review encourages anticipatory compliance by the regulated community.
ii.

Disputed Wells and Unloaded Wells

Two issues that arise in the context of regulatory transfer involve,
essentially, either (1) wells that more than one operator wants or (2) wells that no
one wants.
a.)

Disputed Well Resolution

When more than one operator claims the same well, a method by which
operators may seek resolution of the matter is for one of the operators to file an OP-

232

See generally W. VA. CODE STATE R. § 38-18-10.3 (1996) (effective date July 1, 1993).

This information is available to the public pursuant to chapter 22, article 6, section 2(f) of the West
Virginia Code, which provides that "[a]ll records of the office shall be open to the public."
'33

2

See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 22-6-26(g).

" See generally W. VA. CODESTATER. §§ 38-21-1 to -6 (1996) (effective date July 1, 1993).
26

Id; see also infra part IV.B.

" See generally W. VA. CODE § 22-6-3.
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77 claiming transfer to it. 8 If a hearing is requested by the opposing party, the
Chief, the applicant, or any other interested party, a hearing may be held and the
Chief may render a decision. 39 This hearing procedure, however, does not preclude
the Chief from declining to determine property rights.24 Whether or not the Chief
resolves the matter at hearing, the Chief may accept and hold bonds or other form
of financial responsibility from more than one competing interest.24 On the other
hand, if there is no dispute (or the dispute can be resolved between the parties) as
to a well, and the applicant presents sufficient documentation to support a transfer,242
this procedure can be effective to resolve the competing claims.243
b.)

Unloaded well resolution

The other consideration in this section involves unwanted wells. Wells may
be unwanted where impediments to profits appear to exist. Examples include wells
with low production and wells with violations that require abatement. Transfer
considerations involving unwanted wells can arise out of selling rights to several
wells - with a random mix of some profitable, some abandoned, some with other
violations. When a buyer takes the abandoned wells or others that either are
currently in violation or become in violation before the bond is transferred, the
regulatory requirements for transfer can become obstacles to the transfer. Thus, the
private agreement between the private operators can be useful in resolving potential
obstacles to transfer. For the wells with violations, that can mean provision for
abating the violation. Examples include, inter alia, failure to submit a production

23'

There are, of course, many private resolutions that may be reached via contractual agreements

-

which could be designed to preclude disputes before the regulatory agency.
239 See W. VA. CODE STATE R. § 38-18-10.5.3 -. 4 (1996) (effective date July
240 Cf, e.g., W. VA. CODE STATER.

1, 1993).

§ 38-18-10.7 (1996) (effective date July 1, 1993).

241

Id.

242

E.g., W. VA. CODE STATER. §§ 38-18-10.3 to -10.7 (1996) (effective date July 1, 1993).

243

Safeguards against error include administrative appeal, complaint to the Chief, or new transfer

proceedings. W. VA. CODE § 29-5-4 (1994); W. VA. CODE § 22-6-28 (1994). The opportunity for
administrative appeal is susceptible to the finality provisions of chapter 29, article 5, section 4 of the
West Virginia Code, limiting appeal to 30 days after the Chiefs decision is received. W. VA. CODE
§ 29-5-4. Cf SKES4, supranote 148, § 7:12 at 7-38 ("[A] suit to quiet cloud on title would be the most

appropriate remedy.").
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report,2 44 failure to register an agent,2 41 waste of gas,24 and failure to reclaim?47
(Abandoned and inactive well issues are addressed separately in the following
section.) In some circumstances, however, the transferor may perceive that he
cannot work on the well due to the provisions in his contract with the person who
bought it; or he may perceive that he cannot get the well off his bond. In either case,
the transferor may seek remedy as an interested person via administrative
complaint,248 via contractual remedy,249 or via combination of remedies.
When compliance may not be immediately attainable, but the parties to the
contract nevertheless seek to transfer the noncomplying wells in consonance with
their private agreement, the parties may consider the following remedies by
agreement: First, the Office of Oil and Gas, pursuant to the Chief's authority under
chapter 22, article 6, section 2 of the West Virginia Code, may enter into a
compliance agreement setting forth a schedule for compliance and penalties for
failure to meet the schedule." Second, the private parties may devise their own
private agreement setting forth their own schedule of private contractual compliance
and private contractual penalties. This second method is susceptible to regulatory
penalties to the extent that compliance cannot be attained prior to regulatory
deadlines. Examples include a well that does not produce during the regulatory
requirement of twelve months,"' a well that is not reclaimed within six months of
244

W. VA. CODE STATE R. § 38-18-15.1 (1996) (effective date July 1, 1993).

141

W. VA. CODE § 22-6-6(e) (1994).

246

W. VA. CODE § 22-6-31 (1994).

247

W. VA. CODE § 22-6-30 (1994).

248

E.g., W. VA. CODE § 22-6-28 (stating that an interested party may complain and that the Chief is

authorized to schedule a hearing into the matter).
249

It would appear that the basis of the bargain would be to transfer viable wells. However, to the

extent that wells not in compliance are part of the bargain, the bargain should provide for private
remedies - because the transfer of wells between operators bonds is the regulatory place where
noncomplying wells may be identified and required to attain compliance. See also W. VA. CODE § 227-1 to -3 (1994) (covering statutory landowner remedy); cf CSX Transp. Inc. v. PKV Ltd. Partnership,
906 F. Supp. 339 (S.D.W. Va. 1995) (holding that adjacent landowner not entitled to statutory remedy,
but common law causes of action not precluded); Miller v. N.R.M. Petroleum Corp., 570 F. Supp. 28,
31 (N.D.W. Va. 1983) ("W. Va. statutory plan afford all parties in interest [on adjacent tracts within
a drilling unit or pool] an opportunity to be protected."). See generally Donnell, supranote 10.
250 See, e.g., W. VA. CODE STATE R.

§ 38-22-7 (1996) (effective date July 1, 1993) (authorizing

schedule to plug).
25' W. VA. CODE § 22-6-19.
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completion of drilling,
expired. a

2

and a well that the period to abate a violation has

c.)

Abandoned Wells and Inactive Wells

This section addresses nonproducing wells that pose special problems for
2 4
transfer regulation: Many of the operators of the abandoned wells are unknown;
many wells were operated by entities that no longer exist due to death or
dissolution; 5 many wells supply "free gas;,,2 6 many wells cannot now be located; 7
and many wells require plugging. 8
The state regulatory definition of "abandoned well" is found in the
requirement that "[a]ny well which is completed as a dry hole or which is not in use
for a period of twelve consecutive months shall be presumed to have been
abandoned and shall promptly be plugged by the operator in accordance with the
provisions of this article, unless the operator furnishes satisfactory proof to the
director that there is a bona fide future use for such well." ' 9 The concept of "use"
is defined in the code of state regulations as meaning the same as "active status,"
and active status is defined as "any well producing oil or gas in commercial
quantities.,, 2' The term "producing in commercial quantities" is defined to mean
"production of natural gas or oil or both from a well or reservoir which is either sold
or delivered to one other than the operator, or retained by the operator or any owner

252 W. VA. CODE

25

§ 22-6-30.

W. VA. CODE § 22-6-3(b) (1994) (granting an inspector authority to extend the period to abate to

30 days).
2 See generallysupra note 138.
2" See generally,e.g., supra notes 56-58.
2 See, e.g., infra text accompanying note 286.
2 See generally,e.g., supra notes 56-58.
Id. See generally Mitchell, supra note 48, § 20.01 ("[B]oth the dry hole and the gusher share the
same ultimate fate, sooner or later the well must be plugged.").
259 W. VA. CODE

§ 22-6-19. See generally Mitchell, supra note 48, § 20.04[1] (citing Ohio Oil Co.

v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190 (1900) and upholding constitutionality of a plugging statute).
20

W. VA. CODE STATE R. § 38-18-2.15 (1996) (effective date July 1, 1993) (giving definition of use);

W. VA. CODE STATER. § 38-21-2.3 (1996) (effective date July 1, 1993) (defining active status).
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of the production at severance for beneficial economic use."26' Thus, "free gas"
used by households would not be produced in commercial quantities for an operator
because it is neither sold nor retained by the operator at severance for beneficial
economic use.262 Conversely, "free gas" to a homeowner who is the operator of the
well is produced in commercial quantities because it is retained by the operator at
severance for "beneficial economic use."
Accordingly, one of the first considerations for transferring an abandoned
well is to bring it into compliance. Chapter 22, article 6, section 19 of the West
Virginia Code establishes the compliance requirement as "produce or plug. 2 63 If
the operator may believe there is difficulty in attaining compliance with "produce
or plug," agreements discussed above may be considered to obtain a schedule for
compliance.'(' Additionally, in the case of abandoned wells that are not bonded, but
an operator wants to add the well to its bond, the Chief, under chapter 22, article 10,
section 4(a) of the West Virginia Code, may approve the addition of such a well to
a bond. In contrast, an abandoned well that is already under bond, while it may be
added to another bond, it may not be released from a bond until compliance is
achieved.
Bona Fide Future Use

B.

1.

Regulatory Requirements

An operator may seek to delay plugging if "the operator furnishes
265
satisfactory proof to the director that there is a bona fide future use for such well.,
The application procedure for establishing bona fide future use is set forth in the

W. VA. CODE STATE R. § 38-21-2.14 (1996) (effective date July 1, 1993); cf SKEEN, supra note
148, § 7:12, at 7-37 (citing Jolynne Corp. v. Michels, 446 S.E.2d 494 (W. Va. 1994) (involving case
where lease out of production in commercial quantities for more than 10 years had been abandoned
despite the fact that free gas had been used during some of that period)).
261

262

Cf Curry v. TNG, Inc., 410 S.E.2d 415 (W. Va. 1991) (holding that free gas is not production in

a lease dispute).
263 W.
2'4

VA. CODE

§ 22-6-19.

See, e.g., W. VA. CODE STATER. § 38-22-7 (1996) (effective date July 1, 1993); see also discussion

supra part IV.A.3.b.2.
265

W. VA. CODE§ 22-6-19.
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code of state regulations.' The information that the operator should consider in
formulating his application for future use267 relates generally to commercial viability
for instance, information concerning production prospects, improving prior

2(6

W. VA. CODE STATER. §§ 38-21-3, -4.1 (1996) (effective date July 1, 1993) ("In order to establish

bona fide future use, the operator shall submit information and data sufficient to satisfy the Chief that
there is a bona fide future use for the well.").
267

Id. The Code of State Regulations states that an "operator should consider the following

information:
4.1.1 The date on which the well was completed;
4.1.2 The method which the well meets the financial responsibility requirements
of W. Va.. Code 22B-5-4 and 22B-5-5 [22-10-4 and 22-10-5 (1994)].
4.1.3 The date on which the well first produced;
4.1.4 The results of the initial gas-ratio test;
4.1.5 The last date on which the well was producing;
4.1.6 The average monthly production at the time production ceased;
4.1.7 The formation(s) from which the well produced;
4.1.8 The estimated remaining recoverable reserves associated with the well
without reworking the well;
4.1.9 Whether reworking the well to recover additional reserves is possible;
4.1.10 The estimated remaining recoverable reserves associated with the well after
reworking;
4.1.11 The method used to establish reserve estimates in sections 4.1.8 and 4.1.10;
4.1.12 Whether secondary recovery is possible;
4.1.13 Whether production from other formations is possible;
4.1.14 Whether the well can be drilled deeper;
4.1.15 The estimated cost to deepen the well:
4.1.16 Whether the well is covered by a gas sales contract;
4.1.17 Whether the well is connected to a gas meter or how it is measured at the
transfer of ownership or custody;
4.1.18 Other equipment connected to the well;
4.1.19 Whether the vell is connected to a pipeline system;
4.1.20 A description of the line pressure of the receiving pipeline;
4.1.21 Whether a compressor is in place and whether it is in use on the well;
4.1.22 If the well is not connected to a pipeline, the distance to the nearest pipeline
that would accept production from the well;
4.1.23 Whether a shut-in royalty is being paid;
4.1.24 The operator's schedule for putting the well into production;
4.1.25 Whether the well is currently used for or capable of use for gas storage;
4.1.26 Whether the well is capable of being used as a liquid injection well;
4.1.27 Whether money has been escrowed for use to plug the well in the future;
and,
4.1.28 Any other information which the operator considers relevant to establishing
a bona fide future use.
W. VA. CODE STATER. 38-21-4.1.1 to -4.1.28.
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production, financial responsibility, and income generation. 68 Thus a consistent
thread of "production in commercial quantities* 1269, is woven both into the regulatory
requirement to "produce or plug" 70 and into the regulatory provision for delay based
on bona fide future use.
If an operator's demonstration of bona fide future use for a well is approved
by the Chief, "inactive status" 27' may be approved by the Chief.72 The significance
of "inactive status" is that "[a]ny well that is not in active or inactive status shall be
deemed abandoned and shall be promptly plugged by the operator. 2'73 The effect
of "inactive status" is to delay producing a well for which there is a bona fide future
use, that is:
The inactive status of any well with a designation of bona fide
future use shall be valid for the time period requested by the
operator, not to exceed five (5) years from the date of filing with
the Chief, unless inactive status is revoked pursuant to [38 CSR §
21-5.5 of this rule], or unless the operator elects to extend the
inactive status period pursuant to the provisions of [38 CSR § 213.3 of this rule]. 2 74

268

Id.

269 W. VA. CODE STATER.
270

W. VA. CODE

§ 38-21-2.14 (1996) (effective date July 1, 1993).

§ 22-6-19; see Snyder & Christian, supra note 5, § 5.03[3][c], The basis for this

requirement is found in coal production interests:
The aim is to discourage evasion of the duty to plug; but postponement is possible
if the operator furnishes 'satisfactory proof... that there is a bona fide future use
for such well.' From the standpoint of the coal representatives on the Technical
Committee, specifications for what constituted 'satisfactory proof should have
been included to prevent numerous nonproducing capped wells from remaining
unplugged and therefore eliminating the possibility of mining through such wells.
Id.
271

W. VA. CODE STATER. § 38-21-5 (1996) (effective date July 1, 1993).

272 Compare W. VA. CODE STATE R.

§ 38-21-5.2 (1996) (effective date July 1, 1993) with W. VA.

CODE STATE R. §38-21-5.6 (1996) (effective date July 1, 1993).
273

274

W. VA. CODE STATER. § 38-21-5.6 (1996) (effective date July 1, 1993).
W. VA. CODE STATE R. § 38-21-5.4 (1996) (effective date July 1, 1993); ef infra text

accompanying notes 275-78. The Chief's approval is required, and the Chief is authorized to revoke,
so the statement in the cited regulation should not be misconstrued - in that, properly construed, when
an "operator elects to extend," his "election" is subject to the Chiefs review and approval or
disapproval.
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Because the regulatory requirements governing application for inactive
status involve two separate determinations, - in seriatim, bona fide future use and
inactive status - and approval of inactive status must follow approval of bona fide
future use.275 The West Virginia Code of State Regulations states:

Upon submittal [by the operator] of a completed Designation of
Bona Fide Future Use to the Chief, any permitted well which
satisfies the following requirements shall be deemed to be in
inactive status:
5.11 The condition of the well is sufficient to prevent waste of oil or gas;
5.12 The condition of the well is sufficient to prevent pollution of waters
of the State; and
5.13 The operator satisfies the bonding requirements of W. Va. Code § 226-26 (1994), et seq.276
These three requirements may be misunderstood if taken out of context, in that the
requirement for the Chief's approval is found in the next provision, and an operator
may not, by its own determination, attain lawful inactive status: "The Chief shall
determine whether sufficient data and information have been provided to make a
determination that the well has a bona fide future use and is properly deemed in
inactive status. '27 7 The Chief may, in addition, revoke the inactive status of any
278
well.
2.

Discussion: Tensions Arising Out of the Requirement to
"Produce or Plug"

There are some wells for which there may be basis to believe they can

275

W. VA. CODE STATE R.

276 W. VA. CODE STATER.

§ 38-21-3 (1996) (effective date July 1, 1993).
§ 38-21-5.1 (1996) (effective date July 1, 1993).

211W. VA. CODE STATER. § 38-21-5.2
278

(1996) (effective date July 1, 1993).

W. VA. CODE STATE R. § 38-21-5.5 (1996) (effective date July 1, 1993). See also W. Va. Code

State R. § 38-21-5.5.1 to -5.5.4 (addressing situations where:
5.5.1 The operator has failed to comply with the provisions of W. Va.Code 22-61, et seq.
5.5.2 The operator has failed to comply with the provisions of this rule;
5.5.3 The well does not satisfy the requirements of this rule; or
5.5.4 The well does not have a bonafide future use).
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produce profitably at a later time.27 9 The interest in delaying the plugging of wells
not contemporaneously producing commercial quantities can be grounded in price
swings, technological advances, operators own swings in economic viability, and
operators varying operating costs (possibly reflecting, inter alia, the scale of
differing operators' businesses, the production levels of their other wells, and other
costs of doing business).28 These wells can raise a tension between the interests to
retain, to buy, and to sell wells that are presently not producing
in commercial
281
quantities, and the regulatory requirement to "produce or plug.
An additional basis for tension between an interest to retain wells not
currently producing and the requirement to "produce or plug" may arise to the extent
that the cost to plug a well may be avoided.282 While abandoned wells without
approved bona fide future use must be plugged, 2 3 questions nevertheless arise as to
when in the life of a well should the well be abandoned and plugged, 2" and who

279 Cf BEGHINI, supra note 188.
280 See id. at 7; IDLE OIL AND GAS WELLS, supra note 52, at 89 ("Premature abandonment of such

wells would eliminate access to these resources.").
281

W. VA. CODE § 22-6-19; cf SKEEN, supra note 148.

22 Cf Flannery & Beckett, supra note 176, § 20.01. According to some commentators:

At least three regulatory interests arise in the development of abandoned
well regulatory programs. These sometimes competing interests include:
(1)
Conservation of the resource-for years states have sought to
protect oil and gas resources from premature depletion. By addressing the
circumstances under which wells are required to be plugged, states have sought
to take this objective a step further by assuring the continued access, where
appropriate, to reserves that would otherwise be lost to plugging.
(2)
Revenue implications-The premature plugging of abandoned
wells will, in many states, have a direct impact on revenues received by a state.
(3)
Environmental concems--While abandoned wells can be a
conduit through which contamination can reach water supplies, abandoned well
plugging programs have developed in a way that recognizes when this potential
exists.
Id.; cf W. VA. CODE § 22-6-19; see generally Mitchell, supra note 48, § 20.03 ("Historically, in terms
of costs, a well could be plugged for an amount roughly equal to the value of the casing pulled from
the well."); Id. at § 20.05 (detailing consequences of failing to plug).
283 W. VA. CODE § 22-6-19.
284

See generally BEGHINI, supra note 188.
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should bear the cost?... The current practice of transferring wells as well production
decreases to successive operators with less overhead also successively transfers
decreasingly viable wells to operators with decreasing ability to carry the expense
of plugging with their decreasing production. The final resting place of a depleted
well can become the source of "free gas" to a household that is susceptible to the
costs of plugging a well for which it has insufficient additional operational wells
from which to finance the plugging of the depleted well, and such well cannot
generate sufficient economic benefit to cover the cost to plug." 6
The current "blanket bond" transfer authority for wells therefore authorizes
operators to remove the state's natural resources under a scheme whereby plugging
the wells is susceptible to being unfunded - especially by the operators that benefit
most from the depletion of the greatest benefit of the resource. Meanwhile, the
operators at the end of the well's productive life are susceptible to being left with
relatively insignificant benefits in comparison to relatively significant plugging
costs.
The regulatory funding mechanisms designed to guarantee compliance with
West Virginia regulatory requirements are primarily an intertwining of the blanket
performance bond (and its corollary financial responsibility methods)287 and the
efficacy of ongoing operations being able to cover the compliance of bonded wells.
Assuming that it may be estimated to cost ten thousand dollars for the state to plug
a well, 88 the fifty thousand dollar blanket bond may be expected to cover only five
of any given operator's plugging responsibilities. Accordingly, marginal operators
may be susceptible to being unable to meet their plugging requirements beyond five
wells, and "free gas" recipients may be susceptible to not having operated the wells

28 See also Donnell, supra note 10; cf W. VA. CODE §§ 22-6-29, -32, -10-7 (1994); Mitchell, supra

note 48, §20.04[1] (analyzing Houser v. Brown, 505 N.E.2d 1021 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986) and stating
that "[t]he ultimate cost may well be borne as a matter of private contract between the parties, but the
public interest demands the wells be plugged by any person within the prescribed statutory
definition").
286 While free house gas recipients may not invest money up front as in a "pyramid scheme," the

comparison might not be lost leave them with similar losses.
287

because they could be susceptible to plugging expense that could

See W.VA. CODE § 22-6-26(d).

288 See WEST VIRGINIA STATE REVIEW, supra note 56, at 21; cf Martin Interview, supra note 187

(relating recent experience at the Office of Oil and Gas has been that the Office's plugging costs have
been approximately thirty thousand dollars per well).
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and to not having bonds. 89 Interestingly, the statutory requirement for single well
bonds is $5,000.00 290 - not enough, of itself, generally to cover the cost to plug.
Moreover, the Abandoned Well Act29 expanded the bonding requirements
to all wells292 and established authority for prioritizing use of the special oil and gas
reclamation fund for plugging.293 However, the fund294 - which is funded by bond
forfeiture,295 plugging penalties,2 96 and a special fee applicable at the time of
application for drilling permit297 - to date, has been able to finance an estimated
five to ten pluggings per year. 298
Given the severe limits of the special oil and gas reclamation fund, the
requirement to "produce or plug" - which may also arise in the complementary

289 They may become operators and they may obtain bonds pursuant to chapter 22, article 6, section

26 of the West Virginia Code. Additionally, private contractual remedies may be entered into. To
emphasize the problem, the Office of Oil and Gas has taken an "Oil and Gas Game" on the road to
various small groups of citizens. The essence of the game is that each person is assigned a role in an
oil and gas operator's business life. Thus, there are several operators, a tax collector, a regulatory
inspector, assessor, other people in an operator's life, and a moderator. Each operator is given a
starting allocation of wells, and each operator may buy, sell, and plug according to their own lights in
quest of making more money than the other operators. Cards are then picked up in turn by the
operators as they are inspected, assessed, taxed, hit dry holes, hit gushers, watch the commodity prices
fluctuate, buy, sell, and plug as necessary. The game imitates life, in that the players wheel and deal
until some get out early and rich and others get stuck with depleted wells and plugging costs that result
in debt.
290 W. VA. CODE §

22-10-5.

29'

W. VA. CODE§§ 22-10-1 to-12 (1994).

22

W. VA. CODE § 22-10-4.

293

W. VA. CODE § 22-10-6.

294

W. VA. CODE § 22-6-29.

295

W. VA. CODE § 22-6-26(k) (1994).

216

W. VA. CODE § 22-10-9.

297

W. VA. CODE § 22-6-29(b) (1994).

291

Interview with James A. Martin, Jr., Geologist, Office of Oil and Gas, West Virginia Division of

Environmental Protection (Oct. 31, 1996); cf WEST VIRGNIA STATE REVIEW, supra note 56, at n.53
(giving optimistic estimate of 20 wells plugged per year).
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contexts of annual production reports,299 regulatory violations,0. and transfer
applications"' - can be an important means to foster regulation of abandoned
wells. However, the concept of bona fide future use can be problematic - due to
the "production in commercial quantities" influence upon the suggestion that a well
not now producing might produce in the future. The effect of the "production in
commercial quantities" requirement is that contemporaneous unprofitable wells,
unless profitable commercial production can be reliably projected (or, in the case of
putting up an escrow, guaranteed), 0 2 are required to be plugged by operators, rather
than allowing them to remain idle. An effect of the requirement to produce or plug
may be to preserve the state natural resources for bona fide development - rather
than fostering waste, susceptible with idle wells. Indeed, should leaks develop, well
operators of nonproducing wells can become susceptible to violation, interalia, of
the regulatory requirements not to waste gas. 303 Inactive status, as codified in the
regulations," addresses the tension between operator concerns for future
development and state requirements to produce or plug; but inactive status, as
examined here, is based on a projection of commercial quantities in the future,
which sounds in notions of future profit - notions that are susceptible to failure at
the end of a well life.
IV.

CONCLUSION

This Article examines selected issues arising in the nexus between coal, oil
and gas regulation. For coal, oil and gas operators, it is significant that - in
addition to the traditional safety and operational requirements associated with oil
and gas work near coal - private and public agreements concerning bonds,
transfers, and rights to develop are also affected by state oil and gas regulatory
requirements. The requirement to "produce or plug" arises, for instance, in the
context of bond forfeiture, transfer efficacy, and responsibility for well'work. In the
context of abandoned wells, delay in compliance with the requirement to "produce
or plug" represented by a proffered bona fide future use, may turn upon a showing

299 See, e.g., W. VA. CODE STATER. § 38-18-15.1 (1996) (effective date July 1, 1993).

3 See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 22-6-3.
0 See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 22-6-26(h) (1994).
302

See W. VA. CODE STATE R. § 38-21-4.1.24, -4.1.27 (1996) (effective date July 1, 1993).

303

See W. VA. CODE §§ 22-6-31 (1994).

" See generally W. VA. CODE STATE R. 38-21-1 to -6 (1996) (effective date July 1, 1993).
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of future commercial profitability, or, at least, a showing of a willingness to
guarantee plugging. Accordingly, the operator's regulatory considerations bring
focus back to what is likely one of the operator's initial considerations - the
prospects for profitable production.
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